Brexit and the waning days of the United Kingdom

[Tamas]

I thought I'd rather use this thread for British politics.

So, the whole Cummings affair.

I think even the mildest interpretation of it is that Johnson considers him invaluable to keep his government running. Just being a guru on PR and campaigning is no reason to take so much damage for him. He could do that from outside the circle. Fighting to keep him means he needs him on the spot.

Which in turn would align with earlier rumours that Johnson isn't big on actual work. So he is probably managing by exception and the daily happenings are in Cummings' hands.

The not so mild interpretation is that for who knows what reason, the decision on letting Cummings go is not Johnson's decision but Cummings', and he is too much of an arrogant prick to stand aside.

[Syt]

https://www.ft.com/content/63450adc-a025-11ea-b65d-489c67b0d85d

Britain's Brexiters still do not understand Europe

The underlying assumption remains that the UK is somehow 'owed' privileged access

Why are the Europeans being so beastly? Why won't they agree to the post-Brexit trade deal Britain wants? Worse, why doesn't Brussels understand that it is in the EU's own interest to sign up to Boris Johnson's proposals? As the UK prime minister never tires of saying, Britain buys lots of German cars, Italian prosecco and French cheese.

Britain's government is under siege. Its handling of Covid-19 has been pretty much a shambles, with death rates among the highest of rich nations. The economy is in deep recession. Breaches of lockdown rules by Dominic Cummings, a close prime ministerial aide, have scorched public trust in the government. Mr Johnson has faced a Tory rebellion. He looks lost. Never mind, whatever the fires at home he will "take back control" from Brussels. 

There is a snag. After jilting its long-term partners, Mr Johnson's government still struggles to understand why it cannot hold on to its matrimonial privileges. The letter sent by Britain's Brexit negotiator, David Frost, to his EU opposite number, Michel Barnier, in advance of a new round of talks next week was intended to sound tough. In truth, it was rather plaintive. Why, Mr Frost pleaded, does Mr Barnier keep saying "No"? 

There was an element, of course, of domestic politics. With only seven months of the Brexit transition period still to run, and with the July 1 deadline to request an extension looming, the prospect of a breakdown is rising. The economic costs for Britain would be severe at the best of times. In the wake of the shock of the pandemic they will be ruinous. The government wants to be sure Mr Barnier gets the blame.

Beyond the political tactics, however, the letter was a depressing example of how little the Brexiters have learnt about the EU after more than four decades of membership. Mr Johnson has found it politically convenient to close his eyes to the realities. Most around his cabinet table have never paid them any attention.

The present deadlock is easily summarised. The EU wants a broad economic and trade agreement that will preserve close ties; Britain insists on a basic zero-tariff, zero-quota trade pact, plus a string of à la carte arrangements in industries including transport, energy, pharmaceuticals and financial and other services. The EU wants long-term access to Britain's fishing grounds; Mr Johnson is offering only an annual deal.

There is nothing eccentric about the EU's pitch. To the contrary, it matches precisely the joint political statement to which both sides signed up last autumn. This solemn declaration of intent presupposed an "ambitious, broad, deep and flexible partnership", which would cover economic as well as trade co-operation. To make this work it would include provisions to underpin "a level playing field for open and fair competition".

The impasse has arisen because Mr Johnson has changed his mind. Invoking a novel theory of international relations, he says that winning a British election bestows the right to tear up agreements he has made with foreign partners. The level playing-field provisions — implying shared employment and environmental standards, norms and common rules for state aid, and anything implying a say for the European Court of Justice — must be jettisoned.

Never mind that this goes back on Britain's word. Without a hint of irony, Mr Frost is now telling Mr Barnier that the EU can take Mr Johnson on trust. This, as the prime minister also obfuscates about the fate of a separate, legally-binding commitment on the operation of the border between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic.

Unsurprisingly, the EU27 considers it has a better sense of its own interests than does Britain. From its perspective, Mr Frost is proposing a deal that would collect together all the bits Britain likes from EU agreements with, or offers to, nations as diverse as Canada, Norway, South Korea and Mexico. This unique package would sit alongside a series of arrangements specifically tailored to Britain's interests in the services sector. 

The underlying assumption is that Britain is somehow "owed" privileged access. In the eyes of Brussels, Berlin and Paris, it is now a "third country" — an important ally, but, potentially, also a threat to the integrity of the single market. Forget the cars and prosecco, the union's overriding interest — against which all else is trivial — is to maintain its system of rules and legal oversight.

The Brexiters have never properly grasped that, for its erstwhile partners, the EU is as much a political as an economic enterprise. European integration is an investment in shared security, stability and democratic values, as well as a source of prosperity. These are not things they can give away in a trade deal with Britain.

The upshot is that the EU simply cannot offer the deal Mr Johnson wants. Sure, it can dress up its offer on trade access and reduce its demands on fisheries. But it cannot bend its rules out of shape. 

Mr Johnson is left with two choices. He can accept an improved version of Mr Barnier's deal and, as he did with the withdrawal agreement, try to reframe defeat as victory. Or he can allow Britain to slide over the cliff edge without any agreement. 

The government's dismal performance over recent months scarcely gives cause for optimism.

[Valmy]

Well it is more like they need privileged access, which was why they joined the thing to begin with. It was never like the UK was eager to be a part of some kind of Continental Euro club for other reasons.

[Sheilbh]

That feels like a May era article. The UK government's proposed deal is nowhere near single market access any more. There are extras but it is massively less ambitious than what May was talking about. My own take is the only way we'll get a deal is if both sides decide to do just a trade deal - so the UK drops its extras and the EU drops the level playing field provisions. But Barnier has said, which makes sense, that level playing field isn't just related to the level of access but is also related to our proximity (ie in theory we could have a deal with tariffs and the EU would still want level playing field).

As it is I think no deal is probably the most likely option (I also think, from a UK perspective, it's probably the most politically attractive too).

[Valmy]

As it is I think no deal is probably the most likely option (I also think, from a UK perspective, it's probably the most politically attractive too).

Is it more attractive in any other sense though? Politics is usually just so much bullshit once detached from everything else.

[Barrister]

That feels like a May era article. The UK government's proposed deal is nowhere near single market access any more. There are extras but it is massively less ambitious than what May was talking about. My own take is the only way we'll get a deal is if both sides decide to do just a trade deal - so the UK drops its extras and the EU drops the level playing field provisions. But Barnier has said, which makes sense, that level playing field isn't just related to the level of access but is also related to our proximity (ie in theory we could have a deal with tariffs and the EU would still want level playing field).

As it is I think no deal is probably the most likely option (I also think, from a UK perspective, it's probably the most politically attractive too).

What is meant by "level playing field"?

[Josquius]

What is really annoying about the brexiters is they don't seem to get the EU is a dynamic institution with its own needs and voters. They expect it to just remain stuck in stone exactly as it is as the super agile awesome UK comes up with all sorts of cheats to get one over on it.
The minute the EU makes clear it won't accept any of this? Bad EU! Bad bad!

[Sheilbh]

What is meant by "level playing field"?

So the EU position is that a trade agreement will be conditional on "sufficient guarantees for a level playing field". The UK position is they won't accept anything more on this than the non-regression rules in recent "normal" European trade deals - such as with Japan and Canada.

The key areas for the EU are workers' rights, competition and state aid, environmental protections and tax (at least we don't have the embarrassment of Jean-Claude Juncker raising this point).

And the positions are just very different. The EU says it wants legally binding commitments, a continuing use of EU standards as a reference point and strong enforcement and dispute mechanisms (in FTAs these are not normally subject to the dispute procedures - and tend to be weak on enforcement; the EU basically wants an overarching sort of association agreement that covers trade and other stuff but has quite robust enforcement and disputes provisions). The UK position is it will maintain the highest standards in this area but will not agree to legal obligations that go beyond what is in the EU deals with Canada, Japan or South Korea (non-regression) and will not agree to the enhanced enforcement or disputes provision. And the UK have said they are not interested in an association agreement.

Most of the areas are probably non-controversial - you know the pricniples on tax and competition could be agreed.

The most difficult one is state aid because the EU wants "dynamic alignment" so the UK follows existing and future rules, the EU could take "interim measures" if the UK failed to adopt new regulations and UK courts would continue to be bound by and refer questions to the European courts. The UK position is that EU law will cease to apply and it's unreasonably for the UK or EU to restrict the other's autonomy (subject to non-regression).

The other big issue is fisheries which is a huge issue always in European negotiations but from everything I've read, both sides think they could reach a deal on this. But the structure and the stuff around level playing fields and enforcement/disputes are really fundamental. It's why I'm dubious about the benefit of extending the transition period for new negotiations, because if the parties don't agrees on the fundamental of what they're trying to agree it just strikes me as pointless.

[Sheilbh]

Is it more attractive in any other sense though? Politics is usually just so much bullshit once detached from everything else.

I mean I've said before - May wanted substantial access to the single market and to stay in the customs union; Johnson basically doesn't really want access to the single market or to stay in the customs union. The economic impact of that change in policy is huge. So even if we get a deal there's a big shock coming. The difference between that plus or minus a trade deal is relatively low in comparison.

The UK government is choosing an economic shock and it's not what I'd do. But that boat sailed years ago. And they've got an 80 seat majority so I don't think there's much point stressing out about the policy; on the politics, it is politically attractive for now but I think Labour have been quite canny in basically just stepping back so the government own this.

[Zanza]

The trade deal isn't even the complicated part. It's that Britain wants to cherry pick a lot of other things it considers advantageous for itself, but does not agree that there should be an overarching framework, including governance and arbitration mechanisms. Stuff like airline liberalization, financial passporting, aircraft and chemicals certification, access to research and education programs etc. But always just partially and always with a separate, new, privileged access mechanism.

You know how much of a folly I consider Brexit. But giving in to that as the EU would be an even greater folly.

[The Brain]

At least UK politicians are used to getting beaten from public schools.

[Sheilbh]

The trade deal isn't even the complicated part. It's that Britain wants to cherry pick a lot of other things it considers advantageous for itself, but does not agree that there should be an overarching framework, including governance and arbitration mechanisms. Stuff like airline liberalization, financial passporting, aircraft and chemicals certification, access to research and education programs etc. But always just partially and always with a separate, new, privileged access mechanism.

You know how much of a folly I consider Brexit. But giving in to that as the EU would be an even greater folly.

As with this article - I think a lot of that's three years old though.

So take financial services, the EU and UK draft deals on financial services are pretty similar - no-one is talking passporting anymore or thinks it's an option. The UK is definitely proposing more than a normal FTA, but the main difference is the EU wants to be able to unilaterally withdraw equivalence as is standard, while the UK wants a "structured process" for withdrawing equivalence. It strikes me as an area where there's space for a deal (especially as equivalence + unilateral withdrawal is the default position with no deal). The other more ambitious asks are around digital and professional qualifications.

On research cooperation the two sides are broadly agreed. On air transport both sides are fairly similar and basically acknowledge there needs to be a new UK-EU CATA (like with Canada or the US) - there's disagreements but from what I've seen this is an area where there's a relatively easy route to agreement.

There are areas where the UK is being very ambitious in its ask, but it's a million miles from the level of access or privileged arrangements May was pushing for (probably - I think May wanted access plus customs union like Northern Ireland now, but it's difficult to divine whereas now we have a draft EU text and a draft UK text). As I say I think that's why if there's a deal, it'll be the UK giving up those ambitious asks and the EU giving up LPF. So basically a normal trade agreement.

I think even the structure stuff can be negotiated - for example both sides are confortable with arbitration mechanisms - but the EU wants it to have the ability to refer to the ECJ for questions of European law, while the UK doesn't want any part of their obligations to be part of the EU legal order, so this arbitration would be like agreements with other countries.

[Sheilbh]

Meanwhile, it's day 3 of the Daily Star. The Cummings story has radicalised the Daily Star


For context yesterday's main headline was a former soap star haunting the set of Corrie. The Star very rarely runs with politics, certainly not for three days in a row. Apparently their "mask" edition sold out

[Zanza]

It's three years old because nothing substantial has changed since then. The UK wants to cherry-pick, the EU wants a comprehensive agreement. I guess we will all just wait another month for this farce to be over. As you said, no deal is politically preferable by now.

Then both sides can concentrate on the economic consequences of the pandemic.

Have a five year cool-down with the existing United Nations rules in place and then start talking about a future relationship again.

[Zoupa]

I could be wrong, but I actually suspect that in about 5 years time we'll end up with a higher level of immigration out of the EU than we had in it.

Why would EU citizens move to the UK in the next 5 years?