Brexit and the waning days of the United Kingdom

[Valmy]

That is approaching cult thinking.

[garbon]

Approaching??

[Sheilbh]

That is approaching cult thinking.

https://www.theguardian.com/politics/video/2019/dec/13/i-want-momentum-gone-alan-johnson-slams-labour-left-video
"The culture of betrayal goes on. You'll hear it now more and more over the next couple of days as this little cult get their act together. I want them out of the party."

Edit: Also, Jonathan Freedland on precisely this theme:

This is a repudiation of Corbynism. Labour needs to ditch the politics of the sect
Jonathan Freedland
A 1970s hard-left clique led the party into a dead end – and it's the poor and vulnerable who will pay the price
Fri 13 Dec 2019 16.41 GMT

We can skip the first stage of grief. A result like this leaves no room for denial. Let's move instead to the next stage: anger. We can feel a deep and bitter fury at what five more years of Boris Johnson will mean – at what his government, armed with such a mandate, will do. It will allow him to pursue a hard Brexit, to cosy up to Donald Trump and to trample on our democratic norms and judicial restraints. It will risk the union. It will allow him to ignore the poorest and most vulnerable, the children going to school hungry, to abandon the people whose lives and communities have been made thin by a lost decade of austerity and shrunken services – a decade that will now stretch, like a prison sentence, to 15 years.

We can be angry at the Tories for winning this election, but we must feel an equal rage for the people who let them do it. I am speaking of those who led the main party of opposition down a blind alley that ended in Labour's worst election performance since the 1930s – a performance that broke new records for failure. Look upon the scale of that calamity: to lose seats to a government in power for nine lean years, a government seeking a fourth term that is almost never granted, a cruel government so divided it purged two former chancellors and some of its best-known MPs, led by a documented liar and fraud. A half-functioning opposition party would have wiped the floor with this Tory party. Instead, Labour was crushed by it.

The leadership's defenders wasted no time in blaming it all on Brexit. To be sure, Brexit has convulsed our politics and made Labour's electoral coalition perilously hard to hold together. But pause before declaring that this was the Brexit election: in fact, the NHS overtook Brexit as voters' top concern. The trouble was, voters trusted Johnson on the NHS more than they trusted Jeremy Corbyn. You read that right.

Which brings us to a core point that those culpable for this disaster would rather you didn't contemplate. Like anyone who travelled the country and listened to voters, candidates and canvassers, I heard with my own ears the Labour voters who said they couldn't back the party this time, not because of Brexit but because of Corbyn. Indeed, Brexit was often cited not for its own sake – little of this campaign was spent debating customs zones and trade agreements – but rather for its confirmation of their view that Corbyn was irredeemably "weak".

This problem did not wait until the election to reveal itself. The polling data was clear and voluminous on this point long before the election. Corbyn is the most unpopular opposition leader since records began. And though we may not like it, we know that voters' assessment of the party leaders plays a huge part in their decision.

Labour knew it and Corbyn knew it. Those appalling numbers were not state secrets. His admirers always describe him as a selfless, almost saintly man, devoid of ego. So why didn't he take one look at his own ratings and say, "I am clearly a drag on this party's prospects. Those who need a Labour government have a better chance of getting one if I step aside." Not a chance.

Corbyn's own vanity was too great for him even to consider such an act of self-sacrifice. Instead he was encouraged by his own devoted legions of supporters, for whom the idea of a change of leader was heresy. In their mind, it was better to lose under Corbyn than to have a shot at winning with someone – anyone – else.

Perhaps it was too much to ask that he make way for a candidate less sure to repel the electorate. But he made this a presidential campaign, his face everywhere, other Labour heavyweights banished from the airwaves. In their place were factionally approved nodding dogs such as Richard Burgon. Never mind that they were bound to be useless, what mattered was that they were loyal to the ruling clique.

Of course, this relates not just to Corbyn but Corbynism. For the last four years, Labour has been in thrall to the notion that it's better to have a manifesto you can feel proud of, a programme that calls itself radical, than to devise one that might have a chance of winning. Some even argued that, "win or lose", Corbyn achieved much simply by offering a genuinely socialist plan – in contrast with Labour's 1997 offer, which was so boringly modest and incremental.

Well, guess what. Labour's "radical" manifesto of 2019 achieved precisely nothing. Not one proposal in it will be implemented, not one pound in it will be spent. It is worthless. And if judged not by the academic standard of "expanding the discourse", but by the hard, practical measure of improving actual people's actual lives, those hate figures of Corbynism – Tony Blair and Gordon Brown – achieved more in four hours than Corbyn achieved in four years. Why? Because they did what it took to win power.

That's what a political party is for. It's not a hobby; it's not a pressure group that exists to open the Overton window a little wider; it's not an association for making friends or hosting stimulating conversations and seminars; it's not "a 30-year project". Its purpose is to win and exercise power in the here and now. It is either a plausible vehicle for government or it is nothing.

That was beyond the reach of the faction ruling Labour. Not for them the electoral basics of reassurance and credibility. They came up with a manifesto more stuffed with giveaways than Santa's grotto, and about as believable. The voter who quite liked the extra sugar in their tea represented by, say, free tuition fees, gagged when the sweetener of discounted rail fares, Waspi compensation, free broadband and a promised £6,700 a year to every family were all spooned into the cup.

Labour's ruling elite forgot that parties of the left are held to a higher standard than those committed to the status quo: to change people's lives and spend their money, first you must win their trust. That obligation is even spelled out in Labour's constitution, which insists that "Labour seeks the trust of the people to govern." Instead, the leadership clique dragged around their 1970s baggage and arcane ideological obsessions – the antisemitism arose not by accident, but as the inevitable outgrowth of a strain of left conspiracist thinking – that marked them out as cranks, unfit to run the country.

To warn of this danger and sound the alarm was to be instantly howled down as a Blairite, a centrist, a red Tory. On social media, a group of outriders policed the conversation, unleashing a pile-on of mockery and denunciation on anyone guilty of pointing out that the emperor seemed to be unnervingly lacking in clothes. (Then they affected surprise when those they'd told to "fuck off and join the Tories" didn't come running to help.)

The tragedy of this is measured in the idealistic young volunteers who signed up for a new and necessary movement in 2015, but whose faith was abused by a clique of hard-left sectarian dinosaurs – and, most important, it is measured in the millions who needed a social democratic government and now won't get one.

The question now is, how long will it take to draw the obvious conclusion? You might have thought that the experience of the 1980s – four defeats in a row, followed by a march towards electability – had been education enough. We'd seen this movie before but, it seems, we needed to see it all over again.

We'll have a clue whether it'll take a fifth – or sixth – defeat for the penny to drop when Labour selects a new leader. Will it look for someone who ticks all the ideological boxes, who's as sound and "radical" as Corbyn, or will it look for someone who can win?

Underneath that is a larger question: are you in politics to control the Labour party, or to win power? If the honest answer is the former, then get out of the way. Go back to your student unions and your pub meetings and give Labour back to those who seek the power of government – and are fit to wield it.

• Jonathan Freedland is a Guardian columnist/quote]

[mongers]

Labour failed not so much because of Brexit but because of their 'leaders' bewildering non-stance on The issue of the day, Brexit.

For others the failure was the leaders:

Reckless spending promises,
or
Failure to tackle an emergent anti-Semitism
or
unrealistic nationalisation plans
or
past terrorism sympathies.

Though often the common denominator in all of these was the failings of Jeremy Corbyn as a leader. Oh and the weakness of the mainstream party to stand up to him and his clique.

[Sheilbh]

Another excellent John Harris piece:
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/video/2019/dec/13/anywhere-but-westminster-how-labour-lost-and-the-hope-that-endures-video

[The Larch]

I do think the lack of European care about the geo-politics of Brexit is extraordinary. But I think the European lack of concern with geo-politics is in general extraordinary. So it's not surprising.

What?

[Zoupa]

Shelf, that;s pretty rich coming from a brit... The UK was a major thwart to any king of geopolitical EU weight-throwing. Hopefully that changes once you guys leave.

I know Macron must be thrilled, for example.

[Sheilbh]

What?

So - I don't think (with the exception of Macron possibly) anyone's thinking strategically. Helen Thomas has talked about this, but the UK is one of two NATO member states in Europe that contributes significantly and has done increasingly within Europe since the Brexit vote, probably as reassurance. We're still in the EU so all of the questions of what happens when we leave can be deferred.

It's not all anything to do with Brexit - NATO is coming to the fore in European politics, because of general pressure on NATO (Trump, actual deployments or lack of them etc) and the Franco-German disagreements sort of reflect that. It's built up but the "brain death" comments and Merkel's response is pretty robust. But there's a fundamental difference of positions: Germany is utterly commited to NATO but isn't willing to fund a military force to back it; France is indifferent to NATO but is committed to having a military and taking European security seriously. As an additional complication German politics is going domestic at the moment and they are little missing in action on lots of issues in Europe because of their internal politics. Britain is sort of in the middle with German commitment to NATO, but French willingness to fund (and deploy - eg to Estonia). And as the UK leaves the common EU framework I think that difference is going to become more acute and more challenging - I don't know what the European answer is. What is the basis of European security and how does it include, or not, one of the two states in Europe that actually spends money on defence?

You know if you look at this from the perspective of a Central/Eastern European member, say, Estonia it's absurd. One of the two most important NATO states in the EU is leaving and you're told that the future relationship between the EU and that important security partner depends on the Irish border - it's crazy (from Estonia, it's perfectly from Dublin). Is it worth any of those states burning political capital within Europe? Maybe not, but Europe's Eastern frontier matters as much as the tiny volume of inter-Ireland trade.

Which is a function of the EU being an economic entity so its sole focus has been on protecting the single market. That makes sense, but there's a potential trade-off if that carries on in what relationship there will be - for example I've read that both sides expect data sharing between police services to end, which I'm not sure benefits anyone. My understanding is the UK provides an outsized amount of data, but also research, technology and equipment within Europe's defence and security establishment, but obviously gains a stronger voice because of it. It is possible that NATO carries on fine and we can ring-fence the security relationship - so we have a "thick" defence relationship and a "thin" trading one. But it's equally possible that won't happen and there's a choice for the parties.

And I think Europe has done the easy bit, the divorce: prioritise Ireland, protect the single market, get the bills paid. I don't think that the EU has really thought through what sort of relationship the EU should be trying to have with the EU. I think that's a more difficult question to get unity. But I think it reflects a wider weakness of Europe engaging with it's neighbours which is basically done on the basis of they're either trying to join or they're not - and those are the two models of relationship, which is particularly acute in the Balkans and Ukraine.

Now I'm not sure that this thinking has gone on in the UK either, but ultimately it has a bit less of an impact for us. We'll just be a middle ranked power, with a big neighbour, like Japan or Canada. And we don't have a border with Russia, or the Balkans and Ukraine and we're not wanting support in operations in the Sahel and Middle East. The big question facing Europe is how do you address those security issues when, as Macron says, there's a brain death in NATO despite all of his partners symbolic support and within EU only France is willing to spend? If NATO carries on eroding - what's the situation for Central and Eastern Europe? If there's an intention to act on a European level can that really be achieved with only France actively participating? I think the nature of the future relationship with the UK will impact those questions, plus as I say the R&D links, the technology and data links, the resource-sharing of equipment - again without the UK, France will be doing a huge amount of heavy lifting in that area and is it plausible to basically rely on one member state for all this?

Of course all of this becomes easier if Germany changes its approach, but I just don't see that happening.

[Sheilbh]

Shelf, that;s pretty rich coming from a brit... The UK was a major thwart to any king of geopolitical EU weight-throwing. Hopefully that changes once you guys leave.

I mean, I wasn't ever opposed 

I think it's wider and more basic than EU weight-throwing, it's EU security more generally.

Edit: And on a wider base I think it's the lack of a neighbourhood policy that works. The UK could be an opportunity for the EU to develop - to use an EU style phrase - modalities of relationship for it's neighbours. The current model is: member states, applicants, everyone else. After the Macron veto in the Balkans, expansion looks unlikely. But with a range of neighbours from the UK, Norway, Russia, Ukraine, Bosnia I think it'd be worth the UK considering what it's approach and models for those neighbours are.

I know Macron must be thrilled, for example.

Maybe. I suspect on the future relationship, the German approach will be legalistic and economically driven and the French approach will be creative and security driven. Could be wrong.

[The Minsky Moment]

Corbyn staying on to oversee a "process of reflection" but will not lead Labour into the next election.

"Process of Reflection".

Seems fine as long as the Reflection is his ass in the mirror on his (rapid) way out.

[The Minsky Moment]

An epically unpopular prime minister calls for an unpopular early election betting that the opposition is hated even more, and wins in a historic landslide...

Democracy seems to be broken. 

I would say WAD. The inherent and unalienable right to select the slightly lesser of two evils is at the heart of what democracy is about,

[Crazy_Ivan80]

the eu will do that on it's own anyway.

Only because they located their administrative center in a city full of Flems!

you know nothing.

[Iormlund]

I do think the lack of European care about the geo-politics of Brexit is extraordinary. But I think the European lack of concern with geo-politics is in general extraordinary. So it's not surprising.

That's not exactly a European thing. An overwhelming majority of voters in most democracies show no interest in politics. And of those who do, very few want to exit their own echo chambers.

[The Larch]

What?

So - I don't think (with the exception of Macron possibly) anyone's thinking strategically. Helen Thomas has talked about this, but the UK is one of two NATO member states in Europe that contributes significantly and has done increasingly within Europe since the Brexit vote, probably as reassurance. We're still in the EU so all of the questions of what happens when we leave can be deferred.

It's not all anything to do with Brexit - NATO is coming to the fore in European politics, because of general pressure on NATO (Trump, actual deployments or lack of them etc) and the Franco-German disagreements sort of reflect that. It's built up but the "brain death" comments and Merkel's response is pretty robust. But there's a fundamental difference of positions: Germany is utterly commited to NATO but isn't willing to fund a military force to back it; France is indifferent to NATO but is committed to having a military and taking European security seriously. As an additional complication German politics is going domestic at the moment and they are little missing in action on lots of issues in Europe because of their internal politics. Britain is sort of in the middle with German commitment to NATO, but French willingness to fund (and deploy - eg to Estonia). And as the UK leaves the common EU framework I think that difference is going to become more acute and more challenging - I don't know what the European answer is. What is the basis of European security and how does it include, or not, one of the two states in Europe that actually spends money on defence?

You know if you look at this from the perspective of a Central/Eastern European member, say, Estonia it's absurd. One of the two most important NATO states in the EU is leaving and you're told that the future relationship between the EU and that important security partner depends on the Irish border - it's crazy (from Estonia, it's perfectly from Dublin). Is it worth any of those states burning political capital within Europe? Maybe not, but Europe's Eastern frontier matters as much as the tiny volume of inter-Ireland trade.

Which is a function of the EU being an economic entity so its sole focus has been on protecting the single market. That makes sense, but there's a potential trade-off if that carries on in what relationship there will be - for example I've read that both sides expect data sharing between police services to end, which I'm not sure benefits anyone. My understanding is the UK provides an outsized amount of data, but also research, technology and equipment within Europe's defence and security establishment, but obviously gains a stronger voice because of it. It is possible that NATO carries on fine and we can ring-fence the security relationship - so we have a "thick" defence relationship and a "thin" trading one. But it's equally possible that won't happen and there's a choice for the parties.

And I think Europe has done the easy bit, the divorce: prioritise Ireland, protect the single market, get the bills paid. I don't think that the EU has really thought through what sort of relationship the EU should be trying to have with the EU. I think that's a more difficult question to get unity. But I think it reflects a wider weakness of Europe engaging with it's neighbours which is basically done on the basis of they're either trying to join or they're not - and those are the two models of relationship, which is particularly acute in the Balkans and Ukraine.

Now I'm not sure that this thinking has gone on in the UK either, but ultimately it has a bit less of an impact for us. We'll just be a middle ranked power, with a big neighbour, like Japan or Canada. And we don't have a border with Russia, or the Balkans and Ukraine and we're not wanting support in operations in the Sahel and Middle East. The big question facing Europe is how do you address those security issues when, as Macron says, there's a brain death in NATO despite all of his partners symbolic support and within EU only France is willing to spend? If NATO carries on eroding - what's the situation for Central and Eastern Europe? If there's an intention to act on a European level can that really be achieved with only France actively participating? I think the nature of the future relationship with the UK will impact those questions, plus as I say the R&D links, the technology and data links, the resource-sharing of equipment - again without the UK, France will be doing a huge amount of heavy lifting in that area and is it plausible to basically rely on one member state for all this?

Of course all of this becomes easier if Germany changes its approach, but I just don't see that happening.

Sheilbh, I'll try to give you a proper answer next week when I'm on my computer and not on my phone as there's no way I can type on a screen an adequate response to such a wall of text, but let me be very clear in that the executive summary is that I think that what you say is a load of bollocks. 

[Josquius]

I'm not convinced that, if you want a non-London Labour, the best candidate is Sir Keir Starmer QC of Holborn and St Pancras.

Do we want non-London Labour though?
That Labour was London centric is something I've only heard since the election. I don't think this was part of the problem with Corbyn at all. Nobody was much bothered that he represented a London constituency. Afterall, Johnson is far more 'London'.
Starmer really does seem a strong candidate. He's from the centre, but has large support even from the left; many of my loony left friends even speak well of him.
Most importantly he's the man for the time. He's literally one of the top people in the country to call out the Tories on their coming brexit-related failings.
The big question with him is; does he even want it?
He hasn't given much sign of pushing for the top. He gives an impression of being more a dutiful civil servanty type.

I'm not sure what the answer is. The strategic challenges are huge. How do you win without Scotland?

I think here we have to accept we don't. Hopefully this could lead to Labour changing their tune on the UK becoming a democracy.

How do you build a national offer that relies on traditional working class strongholds, plus high-earning progressives, plus students, plust ethnic minorities? Brexit is a small example of this but there's loads of issues where those groups don't really have much in common. What is the future Labour coalition that is capable of winning a majority in England and Wales?

For sure its the left behind towns that are the thing. They finally woke up to their situation and decided to do something about it by shooting themselves in the foot with brexit.
The Tories are taking on this challenge by promising the world to them. Unicorns and a revival of industry for all!
Which of course just isn't practical. They can't keep this con going for long.
The correct path for Labour to take IMO is to start pushing for more of a hub and spoke approach to the economy. Building up regional centres a lot more, however, doing this in such a way that it is inclusive of the outlying towns. Wigan is never going to be a world leading town; but with a thriving Manchester and Liverpool just next door its people can take advantage of these benefits with decent investment in transport.

With the nationalisations there's lots of support for those policies. But, as someone on the liberal left, that's not necessarily the gold standard. The party that would win, based on popular politics is the: hang the paedos, fund the NHS party. Nationalised utilities and well-funded public services are very popular, but so is huge cuts to immigration, cuts to benefits, bringing back the death penalty and a "tougher" justice system. So saying individual Labour policies are more popular is true. But it's like individual UKIP policies were popular. The party leadership may have made that toxic (like with UKIP) for chunks of voters.

Sure. You have to do something that appeals to the voters though.
The Tories are taking the hateful aspects of this- racism, tough justice, etc....
Labour  shouldn't just ignore what they want and they shouldn't betray their values by trying to ape the Tories. So instead they  need to hold to the positive aspects of this. Well funded public services, justice for the poor, etc...
As I've said, I really do believe that if Labour had an identical manifesto but with a more centrist, competent leader, then they would have done far better, potentially even winning.