Grand unified books thread

[jimmy olsen]

Reading an interesting history book about an invasion of an east asian nation by an army over a hundred thousand Christians armed with modern gunpowder weapons set on world conquest - the first part of the Imjin War, by Samuel Hawley. Very good stuff. 

That's not how I remember the Imjin War. 

What is this referencing? I don't get the joke.

[Gups]

That's not how I remember the Imjin War. 

If you remember the Imjin War, you weren't really there.

[Malthus]

Reading an interesting history book about an invasion of an east asian nation by an army over a hundred thousand Christians armed with modern gunpowder weapons set on world conquest - the first part of the Imjin War, by Samuel Hawley. Very good stuff. 

That's not how I remember the Imjin War. 

What is this referencing? I don't get the joke.

You remember the Imjin War? But you look so young! 

Slight exaggeration about the number of Christians in the Japanese army (there were many, but not all) ... interesting detail: apparently, the Spanish also had plans for invading China in the 16th century. They decided to invade Cambodia instead, which did not go well for them.

[Savonarola]

The Economic Consequences of the Peace by John Maynard Keynes.

Keynes was part of the British delegation at the Versailles conference.  The book is partly a portrait of the conference, and more often an argument for modifying the treaty.  He describes Lloyd George as a character from Celtic mythology and compares Wilson to a Methodist Minister.  I found it interesting that once Clemenceau had managed to convince Wilson that the treaty was in line with his Fourteen Points, Lloyd George was unable to convince him otherwise.  Also it was interesting that neither George nor Wilson could directly communicate with Orlando; but Clemenceau could.

Keynes adopts a Malthusian outlook; and begins his economic arguments by noting the rapid population expansion in eastern and central Europe.  He thinks that will lead to famine if Russian grain is no longer available to Europe.  In most other cases, though, his predictions are dead on; most notably he predicts a rise in extremism in Germany.

[Valmy]

All Clemenceau wanted was American and British guarantees of French security but once he had the opening he felt his moral obligation was to push for as many good things for France and as many bad things for Germany as he could. I found that interesting because he was not nearly as thirsty for vengeance as he projected publicly and also that it was this pursuit of what he felt like was his obligation of office that, in many ways, undermined his primary objective. The American Senate did not approve the treaty and the British immediately became all paranoid over French power on the continent.

I did like Lloyd George's quote that sitting in those meetings was like sitting between Napoleon and Jesus

[Savonarola]

Keynes portrays Clemenceau in a negative light throughout the chapters where he talks about the conference.  His view was that Clemenceau assumed that yet another war was coming, and that Clemenceau wanted to cripple Germany so that Germany and France would be on equal footing next time through.

[Admiral Yi]

I think I read somewhere that Clemenceau felt he would be destroyed politically at home if he was less than savage with Germany.

[Syt]

Stevenson in "1914 - 1918" argued that the Versailles treaty was not unduly harsh, especially compared to previous peace treaties (including the one in 1871), and that its failure mostly stemmed from a lack of will to enforce it from the allies (except France who was left alone with it).

[Valmy]

Keynes portrays Clemenceau in a negative light throughout the chapters where he talks about the conference.  His view was that Clemenceau assumed that yet another war was coming, and that Clemenceau wanted to cripple Germany so that Germany and France would be on equal footing next time through.

That is what Clemenceau projected but it was not the truth. Well he thought there would be another war but, as I said, his goal was a triple alliance between the US, the UK, and France. He figured that was all was required for French security.

But he felt like he had to push for as much as possible.

I think I read somewhere that Clemenceau felt he would be destroyed politically at home if he was less than savage with Germany.

Yep. His public posturing was, well, posturing. And sadly very counter-productive.

[Savonarola]

I think I read somewhere that Clemenceau felt he would be destroyed politically at home if he was less than savage with Germany.

That could be, Lloyd George greatly increased his coalitions' seats in parliament in 1918 by running on a platform of harshly punishing Germany.  The mood was probably similar in France.

[Admiral Yi]

That is what Clemenceau projected but it was not the truth. Well he thought there would be another war but, as I said, his goal was a triple alliance between the US, the UK, and France. He figured that was all was required for French security.

And of course French security has been the guiding principle of American foreign policy since inception.

[The Brain]

I just read Den Nationnale Winsten (The National Gain) by Anders Chydenius. In it he describes how the invisible hand works. This was 11 years before Adam Smith.

[Valmy]

And of course French security has been the guiding principle of American foreign policy since inception.

I guess that makes up for that other DiCaprio film, The Man in the Iron Mask.

[The Brain]

Just read a lovely book (catalogue) from the British Museum about netsuke.

[Savonarola]

The Iliad (Samuel Butler Translation)

I was reminded of George Will's comment about Football while rereading this; it's violence interspersed by committee meetings.  Perhaps we're not so different from the Ancient Greeks.

The funeral games in book 23 seemed strange.  On their day off the Greek heroes wrestled, ran, threw spears and raced in chariots; exactly what they did on office days.