Russo-Ukrainian War 2014-25

[Legbiter]

Molotov-ribbentrop is the better comparison.

Trump regards the war as an annoying nuisance so he doesn't seem to have any goals with regard to the outcome. The Ukrainians however, do. So in a couple of months when Trump announces the BEST deal, maybe EVER the Ukrainians are going to say no. 

That's when things will get interesting.

[Sheilbh]

One can also hope that the EU will respond by stepping up its own assistance and by making real moves to cement its own security structures.  But the EU has its own forces of chaos within and it own coordination problems that have to be overcome.

I think it's difficult - and not just because of the forces of chaos. But the lack of forces who are building for want of a better word.

France is going through austerity again because it's on the cusp of excessive budget procedures. Germany's economy has I think shrunk for two years and defence spending proposals have to navigate constitutional debt and deficit rules.

Spain has helpfully proposed that to support Ukraine the EU needs to have common debt - it's a common security interest (even putting aside all the other Draghi stuff). It also probably won't happen. The big obstacles here aren't the forces of chaos - the EU is very good at navigating Orban and/or Fico. Although I get that overlaying the politics of common debt, or a real shared budget onto defence and security would spark other forms of opposition.

But as the adage goes, Europe advances through a crisis - so this could be the on that forces a leap forward to leverage Europe's economic and industrial capacity properly and tie it to security (although the security stuff is very difficult because we're at the edge of what's possible under Lisbon and any change would be challenging).

No matter what happens though, the US will be a big loser. The US postwar empire began much as the ancient Athenian empire, as a genuinely cooperative alliance where a strong maritime power provided protection to an alliance of smaller states threatened by a superpower (Persia).  The Athenian Empire eventually collapsed, not just because of the outside pressure from Sparta, but because it proceeded to exploit the allied states through extractive demands for resources, which made the members more willing to risk living outside the belt of Athenian protection.  Postwar American leaders were smart enough to avoid that mistake and NATO evolved as a genuinely equitable alliance with both the central superpower and the smaller powers obtaining mutual benefits. Under Trump, however, the US is making the same mistake that Athens made and the consequence will be the same: a collapse in influence, power and reach.

Struck by the Singapore Defence Minister's comments at Munich. Singaporean ministers are very often very candid friends but this is blunt:

Minister Rasmussen, Fellow Speakers,

Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is clear to all of us that we live in quite interesting times, that the assumptions that we have undertaken in last 80 years have now fundamentally changed. So that's the starting point. 

The US is the moving spirit behind most of the post-World War II constructs, together with its alliance, particularly for globalisation based on inclusive free trade. We signed a free trade agreement with the US some years ago. But now I am sure you have your own characterisations of what American foreign policy is, but in my mind, it is that America's primacy has become the overriding consideration. Not that it never was, but I think that it has now become the Pole Star of foreign policy, even at the expense of bilateral ties or multilaterals. It is a great disruption, so we have got to recognise that. How countries and regions respond to this significant shift in US foreign policy bears watching.

Now we can talk about what the world will be like moving forward, but I think in any scenario, China will be a key player, and that the US-China relationship will be all important. There will be an impact on trade for all countries, this is a given. It is just a question of how much more. And some figures in the last trade war under President Trump, between 2018 and 2019, bilateral trade between the US and China fell about 10%. Europe imposed tariffs to correct trade imbalance with China and the trade deficit did come down in 2023. Figures came down from about €396 billion to about €292 billon, but Europe's real GDP growth fell from 3.5% to 0.4%. Not entirely due to that, but those are the figures. Now there are fresh salvos of tariffs from the US omni-directionally. The question is how much our trade will be affected. It has been said that trade and security are two sides of the same coin, and one assumes that as trade dependencies shift, security alliances will follow. Let me just give some metrics in terms of Asia and I will situate the appreciation to Asia. For Asia, the US in the last 60 years since President John F. Kennedy's inaugural speech – that one form of tyranny (colonial control) will not be replaced by an iron tyranny, that was the moral legitimacy in which US presence was in our region. US has now willy-nilly – the image has changed from liberator to great disruptor to a landlord seeking rent.

Remember we, in ASEAN, became these democratic countries fairly recently. Most gained independence in the 1960s and 70s, not so long ago. Brunei gained independence only in 1984, so they are young democracies. And I think any major shift in this great power balance is likely to alter the trajectory of ASEAN. Collectively, ASEAN as a group of 10 nations, has about 700 million people, and a combined GDP of about 4 trillion, the fifth largest in the world. So in this indeterminate phase, in the absence of a leader to protect our global commons, I think we must all expect that the progress and well-being of the global commons will suffer. To me, that is a given. It is just how much. That includes any global regime to deal with climate change. That includes any system that wants to deal with other aspects. 

On the other hand, if you look at China, it is 80% of the world's solar manufacturing capacity, and more than half of EVs (Electric Vehicles) produced worldwide are Chinese made. And I think this dichotomy going forward between the US and China will put pressure on trade and security.

Let me end by asking questions – who, if anyone, any one country or region or bloc, can step in if US declines to protect the global commons and how effective, and against what resistance.

[Tamas]

The Fascist Powers have pledged to "address irritants" in their relationship. I am guessing the sanctions as a minimum are going away.

[mongers]

The Fascist Powers have pledged to "address irritants" in their relationship. I am guessing the sanctions as a minimum are going away.

My concern is what will be in the secret protcols of this new Nazi-Soviet pack?

[Tamas]

The Fascist Powers have pledged to "address irritants" in their relationship. I am guessing the sanctions as a minimum are going away.

My concern is what will be in the secret protcols of this new Nazi-Soviet pack?

Ukraine, the Baltic States and Moldova to the Russians, Greenland and Panama to the US.

[Tamas]

More seriously though, apart from being conciliatory toward the Russians is a serious spit in Ukraine's face, the public "details" as such make this sound like a nothing burger.

[Duque de Bragança]

The Fascist Powers have pledged to "address irritants" in their relationship. I am guessing the sanctions as a minimum are going away.

My concern is what will be in the secret protcols of this new Nazi-Soviet pack?

Ukraine, the Baltic States and Moldova to the Russians, Greenland and Panama to the US.

So not Poland this time. Romania still loses Moldova, despite not having it. 

[Sheilbh]

More seriously though, apart from being conciliatory toward the Russians is a serious spit in Ukraine's face, the public "details" as such make this sound like a nothing burger.

I think it probably is. My understanding was that it was always briefed as a "re-establishing relations" sort of conversation. As a rule if Sergei Lavrov is they guy attending a meeting or summit and speaking for Russia, then it doesn't matter and it certainly won't be decision making.

This is the wrong way but I think there's something to having some level of relations. I think it was a mistake to treat diplomatic contacts as part of the sanctions or cultural boycott of Russia. European foreign ministers will engage with their Iranian counterpart, we never cut off the USSR. I'm not saying invite Russia to lots of summits and the framing of this meeting is bad.

But there should still be some of those top-level meetings if for no other reason than to give both sides the opportunity to communicate messages directly instead of relying on third parties like Turkiye, China or the Gulf States (Zelensky's landed in Ankara last night, again - I think the role Turkiye is playing is really interesting - I think they're the last mutually trusted diplomatic partner). Similarly I can't help but wonder if it would have actually given some Western leaders a more realistic assessment of Russia's red lines/nuclear risk rather than overreacting to Putin's public pose.

[Baron von Schtinkenbutt]

So not Poland this time. Romania still loses Moldova, despite not having it. 

Russia has already puppeted the part of Poland they stole last time.

[Tamas]

More seriously though, apart from being conciliatory toward the Russians is a serious spit in Ukraine's face, the public "details" as such make this sound like a nothing burger.

I think it probably is. My understanding was that it was always briefed as a "re-establishing relations" sort of conversation. As a rule if Sergei Lavrov is they guy attending a meeting or summit and speaking for Russia, then it doesn't matter and it certainly won't be decision making.

This is the wrong way but I think there's something to having some level of relations. I think it was a mistake to treat diplomatic contacts as part of the sanctions or cultural boycott of Russia. European foreign ministers will engage with their Iranian counterpart, we never cut off the USSR. I'm not saying invite Russia to lots of summits and the framing of this meeting is bad.

But there should still be some of those top-level meetings if for no other reason than to give both sides the opportunity to communicate messages directly instead of relying on third parties like Turkiye, China or the Gulf States (Zelensky's landed in Ankara last night, again - I think the role Turkiye is playing is really interesting - I think they're the last mutually trusted diplomatic partner). Similarly I can't help but wonder if it would have actually given some Western leaders a more realistic assessment of Russia's red lines/nuclear risk rather than overreacting to Putin's public pose.

Well, for one thing, the USSR had never done anything to upend the international order this much. What Russia is doing now is in some ways more dangerous the USSR ever did. Sure MAD was always a risk but the lines and rules were mostly understood. Russia is now forcing a throwaway of the rules-based post-WW2 international order with the US abandoning all efforts of salvaging it.

[Duque de Bragança]

So not Poland this time. Romania still loses Moldova, despite not having it. 

Russia has already puppeted the part of Poland they stole last time.

Not all of it, cf. Leopolis. 

[Neil]

Well, for one thing, the USSR had never done anything to upend the international order this much. What Russia is doing now is in some ways more dangerous the USSR ever did.

Well, it wasn't for lack of trying.  The Soviets did their best to sponsor left-wing politics in the US, but it wasn't until the internet and the distance from any kind of real hardship that their ploys could become really effective.

[HVC]

Well, for one thing, the USSR had never done anything to upend the international order this much. What Russia is doing now is in some ways more dangerous the USSR ever did.

Well, it wasn't for lack of trying.  The Soviets did their best to sponsor left-wing politics in the US, but it wasn't until the internet and the distance from any kind of real hardship that their ploys could become really effective.

And they switched from paying the left wing to paying the right.

[Tamas]

Well, for one thing, the USSR had never done anything to upend the international order this much. What Russia is doing now is in some ways more dangerous the USSR ever did.

Well, it wasn't for lack of trying.  The Soviets did their best to sponsor left-wing politics in the US, but it wasn't until the internet and the distance from any kind of real hardship that their ploys could become really effective.

Fair.

[Crazy_Ivan80]

Well, for one thing, the USSR had never done anything to upend the international order this much. What Russia is doing now is in some ways more dangerous the USSR ever did.

Well, it wasn't for lack of trying.  The Soviets did their best to sponsor left-wing politics in the US, but it wasn't until the internet and the distance from any kind of real hardship that their ploys could become really effective.

And they switched from paying the left wing to paying the right.

They payed both sides though, for maximum effect and chaos.