Russo-Ukrainian War 2014-23 and Invasion

[Berkut]

So, to summarise the discussion between Berkut and Grumbler.

Let's assume it is 2020 and Russia has just nuked Warsaw. President Clinton is advised by General Berkut and General Grumbler. General Berkut is saying that the US should not strike at non-nuclear military targets of Russia, as this carries a too-high-risk of a MAD-triggering response. General grumbler is saying that the US should not strike at nuclear silos of Russia, as this incentives Russia to fire off all of its nukes before they are destroyed - thus triggering a MAD-like response.

Faced with a high risk of the world being annihilated and unable to choose between those two scenarios, President Clinton decides it is better to let NATO collapse and does not respond with a nuclear strike.

Still unlikely?

My understanding is that General Berkut is arguing for a massive thermonuclear strike on the Russian Strategic Rocket Force, with the argument that it is better to get the whole MAD thing going on our terms (i.e. the chance of knocking out the non-ready Russian ICBMs in their holes).  That's the really-big-risk, really-big-reward option.

I think that is a fair characterization with the caveat that I see it is a lower risk option, actually. It is basically saying "lets take the surety of a full scale exchange on our terms because the risk of a full scale exchange NOT on our terms is too great".

A full scale exchange that Russia gets off means probably two hundred million dead good guys, and a civilization ending war. An effective US first strike sees probably ten million dead good guys, and a not so effective US first strike is probably 25 or 50 million dead, but no chance of it being civilization destroying.

At least, that is how I see it, with the understanding that my "sources" are ridiculously suspect as far as actual capabilities are concerned.

[Martinus]

I interpreted your words exactly as you wrote them.  You backed off ("Maybe I shouldn't have used a technical term in a possibly incorrect way") and then accused me of being a "tool"for responding to what you wrote ("psychotic") rather than "what was intended to be conveyed" (non-psychotic).

Speaking of what I actually wrote, one thing that I didn't write was "psychotic".

Yeah there is a difference between being psychopathic and psychotic. A lot of people one knows in daily life are psychopathic.

[Berkut]

Here is the primary article I am basing my conclusions on, I remember reading it but could not remember the source. Of course google fixed that:

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61508/keir-a-lieber-and-daryl-g-press/the-rise-of-us-nuclear-primacy

Excerpts:

Since the Cold War's end, the U.S. nuclear arsenal has significantly improved. The United States has replaced the ballistic missiles on its submarines with the substantially more accurate Trident II D-5 missiles, many of which carry new, larger-yield warheads. The U.S. Navy has shifted a greater proportion of its SSBNs to the Pacific so that they can patrol near the Chinese coast or in the blind spot of Russia's early warning radar network. The U.S. Air Force has finished equipping its B-52 bombers with nuclear-armed cruise missiles, which are probably invisible to Russian and Chinese air-defense radar. And the air force has also enhanced the avionics on its B-2 stealth bombers to permit them to fly at extremely low altitudes in order to avoid even the most sophisticated radar. Finally, although the air force finished dismantling its highly lethal MX missiles in 2005 to comply with arms control agreements, it is significantly improving its remaining ICBMs by installing the MX's high-yield warheads and advanced reentry vehicles on Minuteman ICBMs, and it has upgraded the Minuteman's guidance systems to match the MX's accuracy.

Even as the United States' nuclear forces have grown stronger since the end of the Cold War, Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal has sharply deteriorated. Russia has 39 percent fewer long-range bombers, 58 percent fewer ICBMs, and 80 percent fewer SSBNs than the Soviet Union fielded during its last days. The true extent of the Russian arsenal's decay, however, is much greater than these cuts suggest. What nuclear forces Russia retains are hardly ready for use. Russia's strategic bombers, now located at only two bases and thus vulnerable to a surprise attack, rarely conduct training exercises, and their warheads are stored off-base. Over 80 percent of Russia's silo-based ICBMs have exceeded their original service lives, and plans to replace them with new missiles have been stymied by failed tests and low rates of production. Russia's mobile ICBMs rarely patrol, and although they could fire their missiles from inside their bases if given sufficient warning of an attack, it appears unlikely that they would have the time to do so.

The third leg of Russia's nuclear triad has weakened the most. Since 2000, Russia's SSBNs have conducted approximately two patrols per year, down from 60 in 1990. (By contrast, the U.S. SSBN patrol rate today is about 40 per year.) Most of the time, all nine of Russia's ballistic missile submarines are sitting in port, where they make easy targets. Moreover, submarines require well-trained crews to be effective. Operating a ballistic missile submarine -- and silently coordinating its operations with surface ships and attack submarines to evade an enemy's forces -- is not simple. Without frequent patrols, the skills of Russian submariners, like the submarines themselves, are decaying. Revealingly, a 2004 test (attended by President Vladimir Putin) of several submarine-launched ballistic missiles was a total fiasco: all either failed to launch or veered off course. The fact that there were similar failures in the summer and fall of 2005 completes this unflattering picture of Russia's nuclear forces.

Compounding these problems, Russia's early warning system is a mess. Neither Soviet nor Russian satellites have ever been capable of reliably detecting missiles launched from U.S. submarines. (In a recent public statement, a top Russian general described his country's early warning satellite constellation as "hopelessly outdated.") Russian commanders instead rely on ground-based radar systems to detect incoming warheads from submarine-launched missiles. But the radar network has a gaping hole in its coverage that lies to the east of the country, toward the Pacific Ocean. If U.S. submarines were to fire missiles from areas in the Pacific, Russian leaders probably would not know of the attack until the warheads detonated. Russia's radar coverage of some areas in the North Atlantic is also spotty, providing only a few minutes of warning before the impact of submarine-launched warheads.

According to our model, such a simplified surprise attack would have a good chance of destroying every Russian bomber base, submarine, and ICBM. [See Footnote #1] This finding is not based on best-case assumptions or an unrealistic scenario in which U.S. missiles perform perfectly and the warheads hit their targets without fail. Rather, we used standard assumptions to estimate the likely inaccuracy and unreliability of U.S. weapons systems. Moreover, our model indicates that all of Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal would still be destroyed even if U.S. weapons were 20 percent less accurate than we assumed, or if U.S. weapons were only 70 percent reliable, or if Russian ICBM silos were 50 percent "harder" (more reinforced, and hence more resistant to attack) than we expected. (Of course, the unclassified estimates we used may understate the capabilities of U.S. forces, making an attack even more likely to succeed.)

[grumbler]

I still don't really see how you target their non-nuclear capabilities in a fashion (and with what assets) that make it clear you are not threatening their nuclear forces.

If you launch ICBMs of SLBMs, you are assumed to be targeting the strategic assets of the other side.  Air-delivered kiloton-yield (vice megaton-yield) weapons don't pose that urgent threat.

I suspect in many cases (ICBMs being the exception) a lot of those targets are co-located, like sub bases.

Subs at base aren't strategic assets; they aren't in range of their targets, generally speaking.  The key is their boomers on patrol.

And I don't know how we hit a significant portion of their military assets with only air launched nuclear weapons, and I still don't really see how we make it clear to them the current limits of our targetting.

You can't make it clear to them what the limits of your targeting are.  But you can make it obvious that you are not using your ICBMs and SLBMs, because they won't see them come out of their silos and subs.  I don't think the Russians will confuse nuclear with thermonuclear blasts, either.

I think each time you engage in an escalation, you are giving the other side the opportunity to go the rest of the way where you lose your chance to preemptively remove the existential threat.

I don't know that the US or NATO has the capacity to pre-preemptively remove the existential threat.  The Russians maintain about 600 warheads on SLBMS (maybe half of them at sea in such a crisis) and another hundred or so on mobile launchers (maybe half of them working right?). Those forces are not targetable, so the West is going to get hit by 150-300 thermonuclear warheads even if every Russian ICBM is somehow unable to fire before being destroyed in its silo.   You are guessing that, in the half-hour between the US launch and the arrival of the first US warheads, not nough of the 300-odd ICBMs (average about 4 warheads apiece) will get off to pose an existential threat to the West, in combination with those that we know will get off.  I don't think that that gamble is necessary.

Once Russia crosses the initial threshold that has been in place for the last 80 odd years, the only reasonable response given our very situational technical superiority is to go immediate and full counter force.

Okay, I guess that I am unreasonable in your eyes, then.  I can live with that.  I think a non-catastrophic response is possible, and costs the West little or nothing.

I don't see another scenario that preservers that narrow superiority. What must be avoided at all costs is having the Russians launch first.

Obviously, I disagree across the board.  First, I think it likely that, for 90% of the Russian ICBMs that cannot fire within the 30-minute window for launch-on-warning allowed by DSP satellites, it is because of problems that mean it can't launch in 30 days, either.  So, the advantage the Russians get from launching their strategic birds first is minimal.  Second, I think that every russian high-level oficial and general knows that the SRF is the only thing that makes Russia credible as a world power.  Once that is gone, they cannot afford to replace it, and their days as a power are gone, no matter what happens to the West or as a result of Western counter-attack.  I don't think they have any incentive to go megaton first.

[Martinus]

Why not take Putin out with a tactically placed plutonium sashimi?

[grumbler]

Compounding these problems, Russia's early warning system is a mess. Neither Soviet nor Russian satellites have ever been capable of reliably detecting missiles launched from U.S. submarines. (In a recent public statement, a top Russian general described his country's early warning satellite constellation as "hopelessly outdated.") Russian commanders instead rely on ground-based radar systems to detect incoming warheads from submarine-launched missiles. But the radar network has a gaping hole in its coverage that lies to the east of the country, toward the Pacific Ocean. If U.S. submarines were to fire missiles from areas in the Pacific, Russian leaders probably would not know of the attack until the warheads detonated. Russia's radar coverage of some areas in the North Atlantic is also spotty, providing only a few minutes of warning before the impact of submarine-launched warheads.

...

According to our model, such a simplified surprise attack would have a good chance of destroying every Russian bomber base, submarine, and ICBM. [See Footnote #1] This finding is not based on best-case assumptions or an unrealistic scenario in which U.S. missiles perform perfectly and the warheads hit their targets without fail. Rather, we used standard assumptions to estimate the likely inaccuracy and unreliability of U.S. weapons systems. Moreover, our model indicates that all of Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal would still be destroyed even if U.S. weapons were 20 percent less accurate than we assumed, or if U.S. weapons were only 70 percent reliable, or if Russian ICBM silos were 50 percent "harder" (more reinforced, and hence more resistant to attack) than we expected. (Of course, the unclassified estimates we used may understate the capabilities of U.S. forces, making an attack even more likely to succeed.)

I rather suspect that the success of this first strike depends on US SLBM warheads arriving undetected because of the issues raised in the detection/EW paragraph.  What the authors probably fail to realize, though, is that, though the satellites have not proven capable of "reliably detecting missiles launched from U.S. submarines," this is because the missiles have been single launches with a shortened vulnerability to IR detection because of the water plume. A whole submarine-load of missiles isn't likely to be missed, let alone four or five subs' worth.

In short, it is possible that an effective preemptive strike could be launched.  I just don't think the chance is good enough to risk catastrophe for when there are better options.

[Berkut]

Well, I guess that all ends up depending on the reliability of the article and reports.

Another article disputing the conclusions of the 2006 article:

http://csis.org/blog/american-nuclear-primacy-end-mad-or-new-start

Although the focus here is pointing out that there is a good likelihood that a US first strike would leave at least some handful of Russian weapons operable, and even 1 ICBM taking out New York would make the entire idea of a US first strike politically unacceptable. While I agree with that from the standpoint of the US just deciding for some reason to truly first strike, I don't think that analysis is the same in the scenario we have contemplated, where the Russians have already shown a willingness to destroy a political target with a nuclear weapon. At the point the metric shifts (or should shift) to how to minimize the damage down by a potential Russian strike, not how to make sure no damage is done at all.

It sure is an interesting (if frightening) discussion though.

[DGuller]

I sure am glad to live in Jersey City now.

[mongers]

I sure am glad to live in Jersey City now.

Well it's easier for you to pass targeting information back, without raising suspicion in the US.   

[garbon]

I interpreted your words exactly as you wrote them.  You backed off ("Maybe I shouldn't have used a technical term in a possibly incorrect way") and then accused me of being a "tool"for responding to what you wrote ("psychotic") rather than "what was intended to be conveyed" (non-psychotic).

Speaking of what I actually wrote, one thing that I didn't write was "psychotic".

Yeah there is a difference between being psychopathic and psychotic. A lot of people one knows in daily life are psychopathic.

I think psychopathic has largely been expunged from the main psychiatric manuals.

[garbon]

I sure am glad to live in Jersey City now.

[Razgovory]

I interpreted your words exactly as you wrote them.  You backed off ("Maybe I shouldn't have used a technical term in a possibly incorrect way") and then accused me of being a "tool"for responding to what you wrote ("psychotic") rather than "what was intended to be conveyed" (non-psychotic).

Speaking of what I actually wrote, one thing that I didn't write was "psychotic".

Yeah there is a difference between being psychopathic and psychotic. A lot of people one knows in daily life are psychopathic.

I think psychopathic has largely been expunged from the main psychiatric manuals.

It is a bit old fashioned.  I don't think the term is used in the DSM IV.

[DGuller]

I sure am glad to live in Jersey City now.

Wouldn't want to be in NYC if the nukes start flying.

[garbon]

I sure am glad to live in Jersey City now.

Wouldn't want to be in NYC if the nukes start flying.

Jersey City isn't really that far.

[The Brain]

I sure am glad to live in Jersey City now.

Wouldn't want to be in NYC if the nukes start flying.

Jersey City isn't really that far.

Do nukes have any reason to make the trip?