Russo-Ukrainian War 2014-25

[mongers]

My total layman's impression is that we should skip development of more modern manned fighters and rather invest massively into semi-autonomous drones.

These battlefield fibre-optic control line drones are terrifying, no current means of jaming them, save for netting, smokescreens etc.

[Legbiter]

A generous theory I've read is Trump wants to peel Russia away from China as happened the other way during the cold war.
Even this generous "it isn't just idiocy. There's thinking behind it" view pointed out this was very unlikely to work and Putin was loving it.

A general US rapproachment with russia at the expense of Ukraine and a freezing of the conflict will just mean a 2-3 year pause of the war. Just enough to restore depleted stocks and formations before going hard at it again. 

[grumbler]

My total layman's impression is that we should skip development of more modern manned fighters and rather invest massively into semi-autonomous drones.

There are certainly a lot of experts who agree with this. Gen 6 will likely be the last generation of manned fighters.

[Josquius]

Even away from drones (which are a big thing to put money into) I've long wondered the worth of putting so much money into these mega high tech super fighters.
Surely getting something 90% as good for 1/4 of the price is better? - 1 vs 1 dogfight sure the weaker one would clearly  lose more often, but thats not really a normal situation

A generous theory I've read is Trump wants to peel Russia away from China as happened the other way during the cold war.
Even this generous "it isn't just idiocy. There's thinking behind it" view pointed out this was very unlikely to work and Putin was loving it.

A general US rapproachment with russia at the expense of Ukraine and a freezing of the conflict will just mean a 2-3 year pause of the war. Just enough to restore depleted stocks and formations before going hard at it again. 

Yes. But I'm sure they don't really care about this. They don't see it as their problem.


For Russia and China.... China certainly does have designs on Russia. Russia holds a lot of firmly historic Chinese territory. Already there's some shenanigans going on with river borders.
Though China is I believe content to play the long game there. Gradually overwhelm siberia with Chinese settlers and let Russia wither away.

[The Minsky Moment]

A generous theory I've read is Trump wants to peel Russia away from China as happened the other way during the cold war.

That's a complete misunderstanding of what happened in the Cold War. Kissinger sought to exploit an already existing and widening rift between the PRC and USSR; there was actually a small shooting war between them before the US opening, and Mao at one point prepared for an expected Soviet nuclear strike. There is no such hostility today between Russia and China to leverage.

It is all academic anyways as Trump and Steve Witless are not pursuing any such policy.  If they were, then Witless would be carefully holding back bargaining points in exchange for specific measures aligning Russia to US interests as against China.  Instead, he is throwing pieces of Ukraine and other morsels into the bear's mouth as fast as he can, with no linkage any China-related concerns ever raised. 

The China "theory" is just a way to identify Trumpslainers and sanewashers.

[Sheilbh]

Shifting to China doesn't mean militarily, but economically. Europe has to (and really should have been) militarily self sufficient without American support.

Shifting to China economically probably isn't great either, but seem the better option then relying in a fickle and down right bipolar America.

Another (preferable to me ) option is to invest heavily in Canada. We have lots of natural resources we're willing to share

Okay but that's not really an issue. Europe isn't massively economically dependent on the US and the EU is very able and experienced in imposing just as much pain on America in the event of tariffs - it's very much its wheelhouse. Europe has also been economically integrating with China for the last twenty. It is already a major trade partner and I'm not sure there's a shift to be had there.

Where I think there is an issue is the effect of that on Europe, as well as the security and energy angle.

There was a big push in 2019 by Germany and France to do an investment agreement with China. That was rejected because a lot of smaller states were very resistant on security grounds (not wanting to piss off the Americans/get integrated into Chinese supply chains that Americans subsequently target) and moral grounds. Lithuania, notably, combined both and has been under sustained pressure from China over their stance. But I'm also not sure it was a good idea even on its own terms because Europe's tighter trade relations with China have also coincided with China moving up the supply chain, massively increasing exports from China into Europe (overproduction) and consequent European de-industrialisation. I don't think it's a surprise that Germany's economy has grown at a slower rate over the last decade than basically anyone's (lower growth than the UK, Canada, France, Italy, Japan) - which has coincided with China's "Made in China 2025" strategy started in 2015. China's economic policy is being a giant Germany - so if anything I think there's possibly a question of what a further "shift" to China looks like for Europe economically. I think a shift to consumption and investment would be a better bet.

On top of that I think you then have the security and the energy angle. Europe has replaced Russian gas with American LNG in the last 3 years - that is a new economic dependency on the US. Even with that successful shift European industrial energy prices are significantly higher than in the US or China (up to four times higher) - other input costs are also lower - which is a challenge and the de-industrialisation is happening most rapidly in energy-intensive sectors (like chemicals). I'm not sure where security fits into that because I don't know quite where defence manufacturing is in terms of energy intensiveness.

American right-wing techbros would also add that Europe is really weak on tech and basically there's a lot of inertia. I think there are sectors where Europe's behind the US or China (AI is the big one at this point). But I'm not sure that's right in a general sense. I think Europe is technologically keeping pace and in some sectors, particularly industrial tech, doing just as well.

But I think overlaying those is where it gets complicated - how does Europe re-industrialise for security if it shifts to China economically which is likely to bring further de-industrialisation? I've said before that I think Germany's strategy was exemplary of European thinking - basically that everyone could be a "partner" and the days of strategic, geopolitical competition were over it was about managing partnerships. That strategy led to relying on America for security, Russia for energy and China for growth - I think each bit has been blown up in the last 10 years. So I'm not sure that simply going to China for growth (still), America for energy and [...?] for security works.

In my vie3w that's the lens - and the challenge - for European policy-makers. How do you address the challenges on energy and its impact on industry? How do you grow, in particular caring about where things are produced? And how do you build up European security (including domestic production)? Especially in a context when the US is shaky at best and Russia will test. It's a huge challenge - my instinct is that a lot is going to have to come from a shift to higher levels of domestic investment, possibly considering domestic production of energy both of which will require big changes on fiscal and energy transition policies. I also think for the EU I think for it to work you will need the firepower of European level debt for investment. But there really isn't an easy answer or one that I think is available right now.

(But it's why I don't think all is lost and think that Merz's move on €500 billion of infrastructure investment may be the most significant policy shift, more even than defence spending).

[The Minsky Moment]

Occam's razor. The Trump administration favors Russia because they look at Putin's one-man authoritarian regime, and its hostility to European democratic pluralism, and say to themselves: we like that.  There is a fundamental sympathy and mutual understanding.

[Sheilbh]

The China "theory" is just a way to identify Trumpslainers and sanewashers.

So my slight issue with this stance (not necessarily on China) is I think it downplays the risk from Trump.

On the one hand Trump and his administration are chaotic. Trump is not, I think, a broad or deep thinker. There is no day to day plan, everything is inconsistent with different people saying different things at all times - the only organisation is that of a reality TV show with the next reveal (Trump in that meeting with Zelensky: "this is going to make great television"). So far so Trump 1.

I think all of that is true, but I think this administration is more different. And that's because I think it's full of people with a plan. I think there are many people in this administration with deep ideological commitments and projects that, I think, are really dangerous. Whether that's Thiel and Musk and the team stripping government for parts, or Stephen Miller running immigration policy. Everything you see Trump doing right now is stuff that (often on the fringes) people on the American right have been talking about for a long time. I think the only people who had a plan in Trump 1 were the Federalist Society and Mitch McConnell - that's no longer the case.

So I think both are true in a way that just wasn't the case first time round - on some areas it's more chaos in others more plan. But I think just saying even thinking about that is "sanewashing" or "Trumpsplaining" can be complacent - that actually it'll end up like Trump 1. It was bad but limited lasting damage. I think it's a lot more serious this time.

[The Minsky Moment]

I think all of that is true, but I think this administration is more different. And that's because I think it's full of people with a plan. I think there are many people in this administration with deep ideological commitments and projects that, I think, are really dangerous.

But their plan is no secret and it has nothing to do with intricate Kissingerian diplomatic triangulation; it has to do with a fundamental realignment of American politics domestically and abroad siding with authoritarianism and "managed democracy."  They are following the playbook to the letter.

But I think just saying even thinking about that is "sanewashing" or "Trumpsplaining" can be complacent -

On the contrary, I think the complacency lies in presenting and treating seriously more palatable explanatory narratives of Trump's conduct.

[Sheilbh]

Okay so it may be how I'm reading those terms. Your issue is more that it's a palatable narrative/plan (although lol that "he's imitating Kissinger and this is good somehow").

But I think that's on team two that there is a plan which is about a fundamental realignment of American politics to move to authoritarianism and "managed democracy"? Because I think that is still "sanewashing" or "Trumpsplaining", no? There's a coherent explanation and strategy etc.

I basically agree on that's the plan for lots of them. Though I think there's competing plans/goals - eg between basically ethnic nationalists and techbros and there's still a lot of chaos that is just chaos.

Edit: Basically I think there's a difference between insane and bad or evil - I'm far more in the latter camp. I think Trump 1 was chaotic and crazy. This one I think has purpose, and generally they're bad.

[Josquius]

I wouldn't say the "he wants to align with Russia against China" talk is putting a particularly positive spin on things.
It may make sense thinking about the USSR... Maybe even to an extent how Russia was imagined during Trump 1...But post Ukraine invasion Russia is absolutely not a major power. If Trump wasn't a idiot /compromised/god knows what their nation would have collapsed within his presidency.
Even putting aside all morals they're not a nation America needs to appease or cozy up to. In this scenario Trump is specifically choosing to build them up.
This says a lot... None of it good.

[Zoupa]

The name of the plane is Rafale guys. 

[Grey Fox]

They keep getting autocorrected and don't notice. 

[grumbler]

The name of the plane is Rafale guys. 

I'll watch for that.

[Sophie Scholl]

The name of the plane is Rafale guys. 

I heard the Texas version of the Rafale has Cruz missiles: for all of your time travelling Zodiac Killing needs!