Russo-Ukrainian War 2014-23 and Invasion

[Zoupa]

Any treaty that grants russia 1 square centimeter of Ukrainian land in its 1991 borders is a clarion call to all warmongers out there: all you need to do is win, might is right.

The obvious lesson to any dictator is we're back in the 19th century boys, go grab that land. If russia gets away with it, Xi will definitely make a grab for Taiwan. The West and democracies in general will have been proven toothless, and we're back in 1938 "Who wants to die for Danzig".

It's also a clear sign to dictators that all you need is nuclear weapons and then you can impose your will on your neighbors, and the democracies are so shit-scared they won't do anything meaningful to help.

A peace treaty that grants Ukrainian land to russia brings us closer to WW3.

[Jacob]

I tend to agree with Zoupa on this.

[Crazy_Ivan80]

I tend to agree with Zoupa on this.

Indeed

[Tamas]

Yeah I thought this was widely accepted as a key reason to oppose Russia. Russia's method here cannot end up being seen as viable.

[Josquius]

As things stand right now barring the Russian regime suddenly shattering and collapsing it seems pretty clear that Ukraine won't be militarily taking back its whole country.
It seems likely the Kursk invasion was about building Ukraine's "exchange fund"; this time both in land as well as people.
Land exchanges will be part of any peace deal unless things go very wrong for Ukraine or Russia collapses.

As to Russia keeping some of Ukraine after peace- again barring Russian collapse this seems increasingly likely.
Its easy enough for us to sit on our high horse and speak about the need to teach Russia a lesson and show them this sort of behaviour is unacceptable...  but we aren't the ones living in fear of being sent to the front line, with our daily lives severely disrupted by only having access to 8 hours of power a day, air raid sirens and random buildings exploding being a fact of life, and so on.
If Ukraine decides it wants peace then I really can't blame them, even if it does mean Russia gains a pyrrhic victory (which is all any victory for them in this war can be).

The west has failed to properly support Ukraine. Absolutely true.
I can only hope we've learned the lessons and will be building up sizable stockpiles of low-tech equipment for any future example of this kind of situation.
Also hopefully the sanctions on Russia and refusal to recognise their annexations continues. Let a peace in anyway favourable to Putin mean Ukraine can rebuild back to normality but the majority of the pain for Russia continues.

As to China... The only way the war emboldens them is by being a giant distraction and revealing how shallow western stockpiles are.
The way Ukraine has won the war at sea off the back of drones and missiles will be a huge stop sign for China and its current pursuits- sure it gives them a bit of hope for beating the US navy, but when they're the invader this doesn't bode well.

The idea it teaches them politically that its OK to invade Taiwan because wars of conquest are fine now- I really don't think it does this at all. China vs. Taiwan would officially be from both sides POV a Chinese internal-war. Its the civil war, which has never had a peace treaty, restarting.
Far more of a concern are the practical lessons. In terms of whether invading Taiwan is "allowed", China already sees that it is.

[Tamas]

Why are we talking about a peace treaty as inevitable? Russia and Japan haven't made peace. The two Koreas haven't made peace.

[Sheilbh]

Why are we talking about a peace treaty as inevitable? Russia and Japan haven't made peace. The two Koreas haven't made peace.

Sir Lawrence Freedman wrote about the "myth of a negotiated peace" drawing on his Official History of the Falklands conflict. Obviously the war was very different but I think his conclusions were very interesting:

What can we learn from this episode in which negotiations failed to produce a result despite relatively favourable circumstances?

First, the distinct elements – cease-fire/disengagement of forces, negotiation of a final settlement, and interim arrangements while the negotiations take place – are similar to those found in any peace process. Each of these elements requires a separate negotiation. The negotiations on a final settlement cannot conclude without the other steps, but it is possible to have a disengagement agreement, or even a simple cease-fire, without the others.

The problem with trying to negotiate a final settlement while the fighting is ongoing is that neither side will wish to concede on their core interests. This is the diplomatic equivalent of a decisive military defeat, and certainly so long as the military outcome is uncertain there are no incentives for this to be accepted. When the issue is who controls territory, the compromises are rarely obvious. In practice there might be a de facto concession of territory as part of a cease-fire agreement but that is not the same as agreeing to make this permanent. With a cease-fire there is always the possibility of returning to the fray.

Second, there is always a link between readiness to make concessions and expectations about where the fighting is leading. The UK would have had no negotiating position without the Task Force but the Junta were still confident, until the British bridgehead had been established on the Falklands, that they could beat them off.  Once it became apparent that this was going to be difficult, their negotiating stance became more conciliatory. Even after the successful landing, British operations were conducted with a view to ensuring a strong position should a cease-fire be unavoidable, for example following the loss of an aircraft carrier. As the British military position strengthened, its negotiating position hardened.

Third, even when governments are fighting a war they do not wish to be seen to be denying the possibility of a negotiated peace, though privately they see no basis for a satisfactory deal. This is especially true when they are being pressed by important supporters, such as the US, to show seriousness. There is therefore always a performative element around negotiations of this sort, with an effort to demonstrate reasonableness, ensuring that the other side is blamed for any breakdown in the process.

Fourth, a credible display of reasonableness still requires concessions. Those made by the British government during the Haig negotiations were not trivial and if accepted by Argentina would have been seen in the UK as rewarding aggression. Haig was probably right that an Argentine role in an interim administration while negotiations on the final status were pursued could well have created the conditions for a deal that would have met the Junta's demands. The Falklands economy was weak, and a small population was becoming even smaller. Patience would have worked for Argentina.

Their hasty action was counterproductive. Instead of the previous record of not investing in the Falklands, and watching them become progressively less viable, both economically and politically, the effort that went into their liberation, including lost lives, meant that they were now seen as a prize to be cherished. The links with the UK were strengthened, the economy boosted, and the population recovered. The military victory removed uncertainty about their future.

Fifth, despite the expressions of concern in 1982 that without a diplomatic resolution of the dispute it would never go away, so both sides could soon be back for a return match, it turned out that a decisive military solution was not necessarily a recipe for continuing conflict. There are still regular calls for negotiations on the status of the Falklands to resume, but this has not stopped Argentina and the UK having diplomatic relations. Forty years have now passed and Argentina has yet to try military action again. The UK has a permanent garrison on the Falklands while Argentina's armed forces have never been fully reconstituted because of its weak economy.

There is of course an important qualification to this last point as a general lesson. The alternative to a negotiated agreement is not necessarily a decisive military victory by one side. Wars can continue for some time without either side achieving a commanding position. The disincentives for conceding to the enemy through negotiations what it cannot achieve through battle will remain. In these circumstances the best that can be achieved, as both sides struggle to sustain their military efforts, is a cease-fire, which may turn out to be temporary.

In addition it is important to keep in mind that the negotiations surrounding the Falklands involved mediators trying to find common ground between the warring parties. Haig came up with a draft that satisfied neither side but he was not in a position to impose his plans against their wishes (although the British were worried that he might try). There are circumstances in which a solution can be imposed, although this will involve outside parties committing resources, including possibly their own forces, to the territory in dispute.

It is not hard to apply these lessons to the current diplomacy around both the Russo-Ukraine and Hamas-Israel Wars, for example in the way that the Israeli government was anxious to avoid a firm commitment to President Joe Biden's cease-fire proposal for Gaza, even after it had been backed by the Security Council, and relied on Hamas rejecting it first. Or in the way the Ukrainian and Russian governments have recently sought to garner support for a negotiating effort that would see their maximum demands met. It is important to remember that contrary to the idea that wars must end with a negotiated solution in practice they rarely do.

Edit: To take it a step further - except for internal civil war "peace process" solutions - I'm not sure what the last conflict was that ended with a treaty and trading territory/concessions as opposed to, at best, a ceasefire?

[Josquius]

Why are we talking about a peace treaty as inevitable? Russia and Japan haven't made peace. The two Koreas haven't made peace.

Considering its not an official "war" there wouldn't be an official "peace treaty". But given the lengthy border the two side and the whole host of issues I would expect there needs to be some sort of actual agreement rather than fighting just stopping.

[The Brain]

If it's just a frozen war then I guess getting into NATO and the EU is harder. A de facto peace (de jure optional) would appear to offer some advantages to Ukraine.

[OttoVonBismarck]

Historically when Russia has ceded land it has been because over a long period of time, continuing to hold it was just costing too much in resources.

While Ukraine is imposing a big cost on taking additional land, as best I can see there is not much cost at all for Russia holding the portions of Ukraine it already holds. This is because unlike say, Afghanistan, or even friendlier Warsaw Pact countries, Ukrainians resident in areas Russia conquered since Crimea (and including Crimea) were disproportionately friendly to Russia before those conquests, and the Ukrainians who weren't have chosen to flee to the Ukrainian held territory. This is good for them in terms of quality of life, but it does mean Russia isn't really having to worry about holding on to what it has in terms of any sort of insurgency or just high resource-expend internal security. The pro-Russian Ukrainian militias likely do a lot to keep the locals in line (most of whom are probably pro-Russian at this point.)

[Tamas]

Historically when Russia has ceded land it has been because over a long period of time, continuing to hold it was just costing too much in resources.

While Ukraine is imposing a big cost on taking additional land, as best I can see there is not much cost at all for Russia holding the portions of Ukraine it already holds. This is because unlike say, Afghanistan, or even friendlier Warsaw Pact countries, Ukrainians resident in areas Russia conquered since Crimea (and including Crimea) were disproportionately friendly to Russia before those conquests, and the Ukrainians who weren't have chosen to flee to the Ukrainian held territory. This is good for them in terms of quality of life, but it does mean Russia isn't really having to worry about holding on to what it has in terms of any sort of insurgency or just high resource-expend internal security. The pro-Russian Ukrainian militias likely do a lot to keep the locals in line (most of whom are probably pro-Russian at this point.)

The cost must come, regardless, from remaining an international semi-pariah.

[Crazy_Ivan80]

Historically when Russia has ceded land it has been because over a long period of time, continuing to hold it was just costing too much in resources.

While Ukraine is imposing a big cost on taking additional land, as best I can see there is not much cost at all for Russia holding the portions of Ukraine it already holds. This is because unlike say, Afghanistan, or even friendlier Warsaw Pact countries, Ukrainians resident in areas Russia conquered since Crimea (and including Crimea) were disproportionately friendly to Russia before those conquests, and the Ukrainians who weren't have chosen to flee to the Ukrainian held territory. This is good for them in terms of quality of life, but it does mean Russia isn't really having to worry about holding on to what it has in terms of any sort of insurgency or just high resource-expend internal security. The pro-Russian Ukrainian militias likely do a lot to keep the locals in line (most of whom are probably pro-Russian at this point.)

The cost must come, regardless, from remaining an international semi-pariah.

There's enough 3rd world countries that hate the west to make that almost impossible.
The west isn't the juggernaut it was in the 90s

[Sheilbh]

To be clear - European gas imports from Russia are currently increasing and we're spending billions on Russian hydrocarbons.

Blaming the rest of the world for Russia's position is like blaming everyone else for Chinese industrial strength. It's very "we're all looking for the guy who did this".

[crazy canuck]

Otto's historical analysis is not accurate.  Historically Russia has ceded territory for a number of reasons. 

In order to obtain a negotiated peace in the its war with Japan, Russia ceded territory, including all of Manchuria which it had only recently occupied).

It's simply not true to suggest that Russia only cedes territory after a long period of time.

It he was thinking about the Soviet era, Lenin cede large amounts of Soviet territory to get out of WWI.


If he was thinking of even more recent times, the Soviets got out of Afghanistan relatively quickly. Quicker than the Western powers managed.

If one is going to draw on historical examples to assert a modern reality. It should be a bit more accurate.

[Crazy_Ivan80]

To be clear - European gas imports from Russia are currently increasing and we're spending billions on Russian hydrocarbons.

Blaming the rest of the world for Russia's position is like blaming everyone else for Chinese industrial strength. It's very "we're all looking for the guy who did this".

There's the gas too indeed.