10 interpretations of who started WW1

[Valmy]

How much does having the best army in the world matter when the entire way of fighting war is different? Or when faced with a crippling naval blockade?

It mattered quite a bit in 1914 and 1915.  Granted by 1916 most of their advantages were gone.

[Admiral Yi]

They were better man for man throughout the war.  They were only inferior at inventing, desigining, and building tanks.

[Sheilbh]

They were better man for man throughout the war.  They were only inferior at inventing, desigining, and building tanks.

How can you define that?

[celedhring]

Yeah. I think there's an extent where these arguments conflate long-term causes of the war and the immediate causes. The long-term cause seems to be the breakdown of the 19th century diplomatic system and blame can be apportioned to all states for that. The immediate cause at the July crisis I think blame can be more directly placed with Germany and Austria.

But that doesn't mean they're at fault for the conditions in Europe being so good for a war, and it also doesn't mean that war was inevitable and just waiting for the right crisis (which is why I think Serbia deserves some blame).

So do you believe that WWI could have been averted completely? I get that Germany was pushing for it given its fear from Russia's rearmament plans, but even if the occasion passed and Russia became "undefeatable" in German eyes; wouldn't then Russia have tried to regain its lost influence in the Balkans against a crumbling A-H Empire? What would have happened with French irredentism regarding Alsace and Lorraine? I think there were too many scores to settle and powers willing to act on them.

[Valmy]

They were better man for man throughout the war.

I think it was less dramatic than it had been earlier on.  In 1916 the French artillery was on par with them, one of the reasons their assumptions about how the battle of Verdun would go were so wrong.

[Admiral Yi]

How can you define that?

Econometrics!

I think I read it in Strategy and Tactics, taken from some US War College study or somesuch.

But you certainly have to concede the 1918 offensives were much more succesful than anything attempted previously by the Allies.  And unless I'm mistaken they were conducted without any kind of manpower advantage.

[crazy canuck]

But you certainly have to concede the 1918 offensives were much more succesful than anything attempted previously by the Allies.  And unless I'm mistaken they were conducted without any kind of manpower advantage.

The 1918 offensive was poorly planned.  It was basically mass a bunch of men where the Allies are weak, breakthrough, advance and see what happens.

Which is exactly why it failed.  I am not sure how that result has any relevance to measuring the German soldier man for man.

[Valmy]

So do you believe that WWI could have been averted completely?

I think so. 

wouldn't then Russia have tried to regain its lost influence in the Balkans against a crumbling A-H Empire? What would have happened with French irredentism regarding Alsace and Lorraine? I think there were too many scores to settle and powers willing to act on them.

France was not going to do anything without Russia and Britain on her side.  Period.  France (well the nationalists anyway) wanted a war to take back A-L but it could only really get it the way things went: it had to appear to be the defender and Germany to be in the wrong so Britain would support her.  France's plans required a British Army to cover its flank, The British Fleet to cover its Atlantic Coasts, and the Russian Army in the East.  So while their rivalry with Germany was destabilizing, France was pretty harmless so long as Germany made no serious mistakes. 

I think Bismarck was right and it required a Balkan crisis to trigger it.  However several Balkan crises had been weathered before without a war.  It really required something extreme involving either Austria-Hungary or Russia.  Just another series of Balkan Wars was not going to do it.

[crazy canuck]

Yeah. I think there's an extent where these arguments conflate long-term causes of the war and the immediate causes. The long-term cause seems to be the breakdown of the 19th century diplomatic system and blame can be apportioned to all states for that. The immediate cause at the July crisis I think blame can be more directly placed with Germany and Austria.

But that doesn't mean they're at fault for the conditions in Europe being so good for a war, and it also doesn't mean that war was inevitable and just waiting for the right crisis (which is why I think Serbia deserves some blame).

So do you believe that WWI could have been averted completely? I get that Germany was pushing for it given its fear from Russia's rearmament plans, but even if the occasion passed and Russia became "undefeatable" in German eyes; wouldn't then Russia have tried to regain its lost influence in the Balkans against a crumbling A-H Empire? What would have happened with French irredentism regarding Alsace and Lorraine? I think there were too many scores to settle and powers willing to act on them.

You should pick up MacMillans new book.  Her main thesis is that it is rather more surprising that the war occurred given the success the diplomatic structures had with containing regional disputes over a considerable period of time.

[celedhring]

I might do that, the commemorations have whetted my appetite somewhat for the conflict.

[Sheilbh]

The 1918 offensive was poorly planned.  It was basically mass a bunch of men where the Allies are weak, breakthrough, advance and see what happens.

Which is exactly why it failed.  I am not sure how that result has any relevance to measuring the German soldier man for man.

Indeed. My understanding is that Germany adapted tactically (as did France and Britain) but were really still pursuing the same sort of strategy in 1918 that they were in 1914 and weren't clear about the objectives beyond 'breakthrough'. Also I don't think the German military had really solved their logistical problems (which cursed them throughout the war) to quite the same extent that the allies had.

By contrast, again from my limited understanding, Foch's grand offensive in 1918 worked in part because it wasn't just a repeat of the first Somme battle.

Man for man I think all the Western Front combatants adapted successfully and sort of equally, general for general I think the Western allies adapted far more successfully.

So do you believe that WWI could have been averted completely?

That's difficult, I mean it's unknowable. But I suppose I don't think it was sort of structurally inevitable, I think the total collapse of the 19th century diplomatic system made it progressively more likely. But that collapse was man-made by the decisions made by political leaders in those countries. I think it could have been reversed by other political decisions.

Yeah the loss of Alsace-Lorraine and the collapse of the Balkans were difficult situations that changed the calculations of the great powers. But the 19th century system had managed the unification of Italy (with an Austrian war) and similar Balkan and colonial crises before. I don't necessarily think that the situation in the Edwardian era was necessarily more difficult than at points in the previous century. I think the way of dealing with it had broken down and, perhaps, there just weren't sufficiently able and visionary statesman to try and fix it.

[Sheilbh]

I might do that, the commemorations have whetted my appetite somewhat for the conflict.

Same. I've got a few books lined up. I imagine when we have another thread like this at the end of the year we'll all be far better informed

[Admiral Yi]

The 1918 offensive was poorly planned.  It was basically mass a bunch of men where the Allies are weak, breakthrough, advance and see what happens.

Which is exactly why it failed.  I am not sure how that result has any relevance to measuring the German soldier man for man.

The one in the north was intended to separate the British from the French and drive them back on their lines of communication to the channel.  That's what everyone does with the British.  The one in the south was intended to capture Paris.

[Sheilbh]

The one in the north was intended to separate the British from the French and drive them back on their lines of communication to the channel.  That's what everyone does with the British.  The one in the south was intended to capture Paris.

Okay, to focus on the British bit. The allies concentrated their forces in Amiens (the railway centre) and the channel ports, leaving lots of other, relatively useless, lines less well defended. The Germans successfully took the bits that the Allies didn't mind them taking and weren't willing to defend. It could be taken but surely it would have been better to concentrate on the strategically important bit. Ludendorff refused to use the word 'strategy' and described his plan as 'we chop the hole. The rest follows.'

In comparison precisely in response to this attack and logistical problems in the defence the Allies innovated. They started to create a more unified command with Foch in charge of all forces in France.

You can compare that with an allied failure like the Battle of Cambrai but which shows innovation by the British general staff - especially in the use of artillery and, to a lesser extent, tanks - and the clear strategy in Foch's grand offensive and the second battle of the Somme (which again shows even more successful uses of tanks, artillery and now aircraft to support the infantry).

[crazy canuck]

The one in the north was intended to separate the British from the French and drive them back on their lines of communication to the channel.  That's what everyone does with the British.  The one in the south was intended to capture Paris.

Okay, to focus on the British bit. The allies concentrated their forces in Amiens (the railway centre) and the channel ports, leaving lots of other, relatively useless, lines less well defended. The Germans successfully took the bits that the Allies didn't mind them taking and weren't willing to defend. It could be taken but surely it would have been better to concentrate on the strategically important bit. Ludendorff refused to use the word 'strategy' and described his plan as 'we chop the hole. The rest follows.'

In comparison precisely in response to this attack and logistical problems in the defence the Allies innovated. They started to create a more unified command with Foch in charge of all forces in France.

You can compare that with an allied failure like the Battle of Cambrai but which shows innovation by the British general staff - especially in the use of artillery and, to a lesser extent, tanks - and the clear strategy in Foch's grand offensive and the second battle of the Somme (which again shows even more successful uses of tanks, artillery and now aircraft to support the infantry).

Yeah, I was trying to remember Ludendorf's quote to respond to Yi.  You set out all out rather nicely.