Ukraine's European Revolution?

[Queequeg]

Squeeljack

He's disabled the board transponders and he's taking this thread to Bactria, goddamnit.

I'm a'cumin, Demetrius!

[Ed Anger]

Weirdo.

[Neil]

But as Psellus pointed out, there's no realistic "third way" for Ukraine.  Either the EU goes out to assist and embrace Ukraine (maybe not full membership/Schengen, but substantial aid and economic integration), or it will be forced to turn back to Russian domination.

I think Spellus pointed out that there is no rational third way for Ukraine. That doesn't mean it won't happen. Politics doesn't always result in rational outcomes.

The problem is that if you have two blocks entrenched on the Russian and EU sides of the voting block--you can easily end up with a 2 party (or two coalition) system where neither can really find new votes. It is ripe for corruption. Even if there is competition and changes in government, the government could swing wildly between pro EU and pro Russia stances (sort of how it has been recently).

Except then Russia gets mad and invades.  Like what's happening now.

[Syt]

BTW, where the hell is Ban Ki Moon in all of this?  Dude has to be the most feckless Sec Gen in the history of the organization.  Dude needs to acquire some feck, stat.

He's scheduled to meet Poutine today, Ukrainian dude tomorrow.

I think the outcome of the visit of the Transnistrian separatists to Moscow today will be more interesting, though.

At the same time, it seems that Russian clamoring that Eastern Ukraine is turning into a lawless Mad Max scenario have quieted down for the moment which may be a good sign (or maybe they realized that nobody is buying it).

[Tamas]

I think Britain is actually pretty coherent as a unit, both genetically and culturally. 

There is sure some strikingly homogenous facial structures walking around here, which is kind of odd coming from Hungary, where everyone is a product of constant mixing of Slavs, Turks, Germans, and remnants of Uralic "material".

[celedhring]

I think the outcome of the visit of the Transnistrian separatists to Moscow today will be more interesting, though.

I'm not sure taking into a federation a rump territory that can't be supplied by land is a good idea for Russia. How is Kaliningrad doing these days? Although that one has infrastructure and strategic value.

[Tamas]

I think the outcome of the visit of the Transnistrian separatists to Moscow today will be more interesting, though.

I'm not sure taking into a federation a rump territory that can't be supplied by land is a good idea for Russia. How is Kaliningrad doing these days? Although that one has infrastructure and strategic value.

You are making the mistake of thinking there is any other concern regarding these than to show just how big Putin's dick is.

[Syt]

I think the outcome of the visit of the Transnistrian separatists to Moscow today will be more interesting, though.

I'm not sure taking into a federation a rump territory that can't be supplied by land is a good idea for Russia. How is Kaliningrad doing these days? Although that one has infrastructure and strategic value.

It would give a good pretext for securing a corridor between Russia and the territory through Eastern and Southern Ukraine (you know, the lawless areas, where Russians face prosecution from Ukrainian nazis on a daily basis).

[Tamas]

I think the outcome of the visit of the Transnistrian separatists to Moscow today will be more interesting, though.

I'm not sure taking into a federation a rump territory that can't be supplied by land is a good idea for Russia. How is Kaliningrad doing these days? Although that one has infrastructure and strategic value.

It would give a good pretext for securing a corridor between Russia and the territory through Eastern and Southern Ukraine (you know, the lawless areas, where Russians face prosecution from Ukrainian nazis on a daily basis).

There already has been talk of Odessa and other areas there "wanting to join" Crimea.

[Caliga]

 

[Agelastus]

So, you are questioning that civil wars are "bad ideas" when they can be avoided, and your problem is with the phrase "microstate?"  Consider microstate withdrawn, and explain why avoidable wars are not a "bad idea."  Not sure about your last objection.  It makes no sense.

It's taken me two days to recover from the fit of laughter this caused.

There is no variant of the English language where "Bad Idea" is a direct synonym for "civil war".

You're original assertion was that it was general a "bad idea" for an area to secede, not that "civil wars" were a "bad idea". Defend your first contention (which is going to be hard to do given there are quite a few economically and politically successful breakups) or put up.

Back up your assertions with facts, or you can stop pretending to be interested in debate.  What avoidable civil war was not a bad idea?

See above.

And I'll note we've now gone from "bad idea" to "civil war" to "avoidable civil war" all without you backing up your original contention. Rhetorical tricks that you're hoping you're opponent (or the watcher) won't notice is only a part of debating strategy, not the whole of it. You're overusing a single part of your schtick.

None of your documents support that assertion.  They describe a situation where Crimean Russians wanted autonomy (sometimes supporting autonomy within Ukraine, sometimes in Russia), but that it was autonomy, not the avoidance of linkage with Ukraine, that was the objective.  That has never been in contention.

Ah. You finally read them.

In which case I think we're having an argument on a matter of interpretation here. Even disregarding the fact that the "we're a part of the Ukraine" line was inserted into the constitution under Ukrainian pressure I consider it significant that the Crimea never managed to come up with a position on their autonomy that was compatible with the Ukraine's. Had the Crimean parliaments of the Nineties truly wanted to remain in the Ukraine they could have come up with a constitution acceptable to Kiev instead of having one effectively imposed upon them from Kiev.

Take the "Dual citizenship" issue - how can you have an explicitly dual citizenship for one region of the country if said region is nothing more than a component part of the larger entity?

And from the Ukrainian side - something like 80% plus of the Crimea's population speaks Russian as a native tongue (including at least half of the ethnic Ukrainians) yet at one point you enforce a prohibition in the Crimea on Russian language programming that limits it to four hours a week? This is supposed to show that you welcome the Crimeans as an equal part of your nation?

Fine, it's for the board to decide which one of us is right.

And the only response so far seems to be that my posts are interminable and abstruse (and since you're already a part of the "Drinking Game" I'll assume that applies to yours as well. )

Oooh, the irony!     A simplistic strawman, right after complaining about a simplistic positions!

My point is that no one knows how much opposition could have been raised to Khrushchev plan to help the Crimean economy by linking it more closely to that of Ukraine.  You don't know, and I don't know, so making any hypothetical opposition, or the lack of it, the basis of an argument is a non-starter.

I fail to understand where pointing out that a decade had changed Krushchev's relative control of, and authority within, the organs of the Soviet Union is a strawman; 10 years is a long time in twentieth century history and politics and given your age, location, education, erudition and presumed history you can hardly be unaware of exactly what in the intervening years had changed that. Not to mention that it is known that Krushchev was able to sideline his most notable opponents in the 1950s (such as Malenkov) where he was not able to do so in the 1960s.

So yes, it is something of a hypothetical that such opposition had existed. But that's not quite what I said - I asked if such an opposition, had it existed, would have been able to oppose Krushchev in 1954.

Crimea's voting since the break-up of the USSR suggests that, at the best, they only want to be a part of the Ukraine on their own (and not Kiev's) terms. It's not too much of a stretch to suggest said attitudes would be inherited from their parents and grandparents generations - the people Krushchev handed over. Absence of evidence of opposition at the time is either evidence it didn't exist or evidence that the Krushchev of 1954 was in a position to marginalise it. Given the other events of the 1950s within USSR politics I'm inclined to the latter opinion, you appear to be inclined to the former.

And ne'er the twain shall meet.

I am challenging your use of "they" to describe the Ukrainian SSR, Crimean ASSR, and Russian SSR.  All were filled with groups with diverging political goals, so saying what "they" wanted is simplistic nonsense.

So they did not exist as entities with their own assemblies and regional governing structures? That they are incapable of forming an official opinion because of some nebulous difference they have that causes them to listen to all groups.

That's like saying the UK as an entity can't have an opinion on something because our government normally only represents 45% of the electorate.

So, while your point is interesting, I don't know that it makes sense to draw conclusions from it.

My argument is that border changes are a violation of international law when they are unilateral.  This change was not, as both the RFSSR and UkSSR agreed to it.

Actually, that part of the article you quoted doesn't actually say that the RFSR and the UkSSR agreed to it, only that no opposition to it was raised during the lifetime of the USSR.

The key line on the transfer being This decision was issued by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and then approved unanimously by a law passed by the USSR SS on 26 April 1954.

Given the nature of the USSR up until the mid 1980s I don't personally find it very surprising that we find little public opposition to the move. Do you disagree?

Now, I had assumed the Friendship treaty (elsewhere also described as a border treaty) of 1990 would be subject to international law; then I realised that the USSR hadn't actually broken up at that point which drops it also a little into a grey area.

Apart from all the other commitments to avoid the use of force Russia's breaking it appears the actual treaty of unimpeachable provenance and legality under international law that applies is the 1997 treaty. Which interestingly I don't recall Putin bringing up in all his justifications for why the Crimea should no longer be Ukrainian - presumably because it's the one thing he can't talk his way around.

Sorry, I'm rambling a bit here. I think the point I'm trying to make was that the border change could be argued as being unilateral...up until 1997.

Even more interesting given the last few pages of this thread that have been discussing the Ukraine's economic situation the article suggests the transfer was made on economic grounds as much as anything. If this is so it appears the transfer has been something of a failure. Does this mean the intentions of the authors of the transfer should be revisited to see if a reversion of the region to the more outwardly successful economy wouldn't make sense?

And yes, I'm aware the above isn't at all consonant with international law; but I have been consistent in stating that the Crimea is a unique situation compared to the rest of Europe's distinct administrative and cultural divisions and thus may need special handling.

I'm not buying it.

Actually I think what you quoted suggests that you do "buy it" (at least in the second form I suggested of "up to 1963".) There's certainly issues with the ratification of the 1932 agreement.

And you only asked for one example.

So, is that "more a part of the UK" or "less a part of the UK?"  You still are beating around the bush.

No, you're trying to get me to make an emotional response in a discussion concerning legalities. If you can't understand my answer, then say so.

Are you arguing that a Scottish political party with a temporary majority of votes in Scotland (or even just claiming such a mandate, if they can bogus-up a "referendum") could declare Scotland independent (or declare it to be part of, say, France with the agreement of the french government), regardless of UK  law?  That any peoples can define themselves to be a part of any other state, without regard to the laws of the state they currently are part of?  That's not how international law has operated in the past (why would Hitler have even negotiated with anyone over the Sudetenland if he could simply have taken it over after a referendum?).  Can El Paso, Texas join Mexico by a simple majority vote?  Can it change back again by another vote? These are the implications of saying that the Crimea can detach itself from Ukraine by simply conducting a referendum (or pretending to, for that matter).

Well, I could answer in several ways here.

I could point out that Yugoslavia dissolved without the consent of its largest component, and, in fact, a rump Yugoslavia still existed past the Slovenian, Croatian, Bosnian and Macedonian (sorry, "FYROM" ) secessions.

Or I could point out that Scotland is having a referendum now; one that has been enabled by the UK parliament...but also one that Alex Salmond claims does not have to be authorised by the UK parliament and that he would have held anyway.

Had this happened should the UK have moved in troops to stop the vote?

Or I could point out that the Ukraine's laws on such referenda (not the part about them being approved by the centre but the part about the whole country having to vote on the issue rather than the region concerned) would be at the very least frowned upon in the, shall we call it, "old west" of western Europe and North America. I mean, why should I, born and bred in England, have a vote in a referendum on Scottish independence? Conversely, why should a Lviv'ian have a vote on which country a native of Sevastopol belongs to?

Or I could point out that international law often amounts to ex post facto recognition of the facts on the ground. The veneer's there but Eritrea gained its independence because its rebels beat Ethiopia by 1991. All the negotiations afterwards simply legitimised the facts on the ground.

I have no idea what this means.

Then I can only conclude that you're being deliberately obtuse. A referendum result, no matter how often decried by officialdom as invalid or illegal is still a tool in the battle for public opinion. Quite a valuable one in fact since the nations opposed to Russia in this instance are the world's Democracies (China being notable by sitting on the fence.)

An effective "weapon" for what?  Referenda can advise, but can only have power if the law of the land allows it; the Ukrainian law does not.

See above; Putin's fighting in the court of public opinion as much as he's fighting against specific politicians.

Not to mention that he's providing (partly via this referendum itself) a layered fig-leaf for his opponents to retreat behind should they decide not to oppose him properly over the Crimea (which, to be honest, no one is doing, are they?)

I'm not going to argue with you that even in the best case this referendum could serve as no more than an advisory of the Crimea's opinion; hence why I have repeatedly suggested he should not have bottled out and have done it by secret ballot. It would have served as a much better tool had he done so.

You argued that "no one would say."  I provided an example of someone who said.  You point is disproven.  It doesn't matter who he is.

Actually I said that "I don't think anyone is arguing that the vote would not have been in favour of Russia", not that "no one would say" (or, at least, that's what was posted in the bit you quoted against.) Which I had intended to apply solely to Languish posters; unfortunately, I foolishly neglected the "here".

Nevertheless, while providing a random Crimean is interesting (and I genuinely wish I could listen to the interview) I don't see how you can say you've disproved a point of mine I didn't make. At most you've corrected a possible misapprehension ("I don't think anyone is arguing" in the world) that my wording suggests I may have held.

Fair gripe about my using the abbreviation NPR.  But, no, it is not like the BBC.  It isn't government-owned and anyone can listen.
try http://wamu.org/listen  that's the news/talk station in DC.

Thanks.

Finally managed to get it to work using the mp3 option for firewalled etc. listening situations (which is weird - this is a home pc. IE just refused to work, and Firefox, that uses the same settings, brought up the player but then only gave me nine seconds of sound in five bursts over a four minute period. )

Do they have a back catalogue of broadcasts that you could direct me to for the piece?

-------------------

Anyway, to Garbon et al.

My apologies if this puts you to sleep.

To Grumbler.

I'll check up in a couple of days to see if you've replied. Have a good day.

[Ed Anger]

Christ.

[HVC]

Christ.

you know you have to, take a shot.

[Agelastus]

Christ.

you know you have to, take a shot.

Grumbler's in the game; I'm not.

Would you like me to take a shot, instead? I've got some decent cherry brandy I've been enjoying recently.

Or some really nice Glenmorangie if you want me to have the traditional volume and alcohol content while being suitably extravagant and, perhaps, penitential?

[Syt]