Deal with Iran?

[CountDeMoney]

FWIW, Foreign Policy's Rothkopf says let's not start sucking each other's dicks quite yet--

Why Hawks Should Love the Iran Deal
...and doves should worry.
BY DAVID ROTHKOPF | NOVEMBER 25, 2013

The reflexive reaction of Iran hawks to condemn the interim accord struck in Geneva this weekend is as wrongheaded as the triumphal assessments of those suggesting it ushers in a new, more hopeful era in the region's history. This deal, hard-won as it has been, is just a tentative if hopeful step down a long and twisting road fraught with dangers.

For the hawks to suggest that the deal freezing Iranian uranium-enrichment efforts above the 5 percent level, halting work on the heavy-water reactor near Arak, and granting daily inspections to Iran's centrifuge-laden facilities at Natanz and Fordow makes matters more dangerous in the short term is just indefensible on its face. Absent such a deal, all enrichment and technological advancement efforts would continue unabated and without inspections. Iran would almost certainly move more quickly toward having a bomb without this deal than with it.

Moreover, were Iran to cross a perceived red line on its path to having a bomb, taking military action against that country without having exhausted every possible diplomatic channel would be extremely unpopular in the United States and worldwide. The political resistance to taking action would make a slower response or lower level of support than ideal more likely. This would thereby make the success of such an effort less likely.

The existence of this six-month deal gives a very clear deadline by which Iran must commit to steps that will enduringly and demonstrably end its efforts to develop nuclear weapons. The Iranians will also have to commit to an inspection program that ensures they are following through on their commitments. Whether you believe the Iranian promises or not, having a deadline will not only focus the attention of negotiators on the more important work of a permanent deal, but also put at imminent risk what is now the signature achievement of Iran's new Rouhani administration (and by extension an initiative associated with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who must have given it his OK). While hawks in the United States have seized upon and denounced Iran's "victory dance" following the deal, they have to recognize that a failure of this initiative -- which would result in worse sanctions and possible military action -- would be seen as a serious setback for Iran's leadership. While the country's most important leaders don't answer to the people, Rouhani does and for him, and even for Iran's Supreme Leader, the damage to their credibility would take a huge toll on their international standing and weaken them at home.

A failure to successfully translate this interim deal into an end to Iran's suspected nuclear weapons program would also be damaging for President Barack Obama. But he knows that he will not be able to win congressional support for a long-term deal unless it is very specific and buttoned-down regarding eliminating the threat of Iran's rollout of a bomb in the near term. At this moment, the president, the secretary of state, and their teams are seen as having taken a risky tack, and if it fails, history will forever mark them as appeasers, naifs who were played by Tehran. The only way to avoid a damaging outcome is a long-term deal that works in the eyes of its critics.

It should also be noted that the Iran negotiations, coming as they do at the same time as the Syria negotiations, contain other risks that cut both ways for the United States, Iran, and the other parties to both sets of negotiations. If Iran appears to be acting in bad faith or if this deal goes sour, the international community will have the option of punishing Iran's leaders by withdrawing support for their desired outcome in the Syria talks -- either keeping their long-term ally, President Bashar al-Assad, in place or accepting a successor regime that preserves their interests and influence in that country. On the other hand, if Iran actually makes real progress on the nuclear deal, the country may be rewarded at the Syria negotiating table. Of course, none of this will be explicit or even discussed. But it is the nature of diplomacy to link such things if they are proceeding in parallel.

It is within such linkages -- intersections with the region's other fault-line issues -- that we also see precisely the reasons why those who are hailing the deal as a breakthrough should be cautious. Even were a long-term deal to be struck verifiably ending Iran's program to develop a nuclear weapons capability, which would eliminate one major threat to the region, it would not only not necessarily reduce other major threats associated with Iran's other foreign-policy initiatives, ambitions, and tactics, but it could make those threats worse.

If Iran were to verifiably forswear the bomb but gain more legitimacy, a blessing for it having protracted influence in Syria, for example, its destabilizing role as a would-be regional hegemon will only be strengthened. Iran has been a threat for decades without having nuclear weapons. It can continue to be one for decades to come without having those weapons.

Of further concern is that by warming to Iran, the United States is incurring the ire of the allies upon which its entire Middle East policy has relied since essentially the Iranian revolution. Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia have been pillars of that often uneasy but surprisingly stable three-decade long partnership. But right now, U.S. relations with all of these countries are in the worst shape they have been during the last 30 years. That is due in part to muddled and misguided U.S. policy toward the current regime in Egypt. But it is also exacerbated by Obama's steady and (as the White House has been clear to communicate via leaks and other means) long-term effort to open a new channel with Iran -- the one enemy that unites the Israelis and the Sunni Arab states.

Any hint of support for Iranian goals in Syria would only exacerbate this (the Saudis and Gulf states have been supporting the more "moderate" opposition in that country in its battle with the Assad regime). Further, it is easy to see America's withdrawal from Iraq as having opened up an opportunity for growing Iranian influence there (because it has done just that without our real opposition). And our withdrawal from Afghanistan could do the same in the western part of that country.

Therefore, one possible outcome of this deal is an Iran that has a ratified right to a civilian nuclear program, including some kind of enrichment programs, and thereby has an ever greater capability regarding nuclear technology -- but that also becomes stronger throughout the Middle East. Those important long-term allies of the United States that have been dealing with the Iranians since time immemorial fear this outcome is not something to be taken lightly.

There are other geopolitical consequences of such a shift in the region's balance of power. Longtime U.S. allies might grow considerably less cooperative with the United States, thereby creating a partnership vacuum, and seek other major-power partners. And should they view a post-deal Iran as a greater threat, they might embark on military programs to counter the threat that in themselves increase danger in the region.

Part of the way to avoid such an outcome is for the United States to work very closely with the Saudis, the Gulf states, and the Israelis in defining the terms of an Iran deal they can live with. Clearly, they cannot be allowed to dictate all the terms of such an arrangement, but we will need and want these countries on its side for the long term precisely because they form the counterbalance to Iranian regional ambitions that we should view as aligned with its interests for the region.

The truth is, the first phase of this deal was not well pre-sold. This is no doubt in part because some of the negotiations were taking place in secret (though reports suggest they were well known to the Saudis and the Israelis as many so-called "secrets" are). As the deal continues to move forward over the next six months, the next phase will require as much in the way of diplomacy among our allies that are not part of the P5 + 1 process as those that are.

It will also be important to send a clear message to the Iranians that we will continue to oppose their efforts at regional hegemony. One way to do that will be a tough stand in Syria talks that adamantly opposes any place for the Assad regime or its hand-chosen successors in the fate of that fractured country. Another will be to publicly restore our ties with our unhappy allies via other means -- having a coherent Egypt policy would help. Secretary of State John Kerry seems to be hewing closer to one than the White House has recently. Let's hope he can seize the lead on this.

Finally, of course, we must recognize that the solution to this problem lies not with hawks or with doves. It relies on having those who would pose a threat to us and our allies know that we possess the resolve and the will to act as a hawk even as we are guided by the aspirations of a dove. While listening to the shrill debate in Washington between the two groups is disturbing, if we are interested in advancing U.S. interests worldwide as we have in the past, we should do everything we can to remind friends and enemies alike that both are part of our national character, both drive our foreign policy -- the doves when possible, the hawks when necessary.

[garbon]

Where is the bolded text on my article?

How will I know what are the important parts?

[CountDeMoney]

Where is the bolded text on my article?

How will I know what are the important parts?

I want to facilitate reeding and comprahenshun skillz

[garbon]

Where is the bolded text on my article?

How will I know what are the important parts?

I want to facilitate reeding and comprahenshun skillz

I've been writing everyday so eventually other people can handle that nonsense for me.

[Sheilbh]

Where is the bolded text on my article?

How will I know what are the important parts?

I know. I had to read the whole thing

[The Minsky Moment]

I understand the concern.

Who wouldn't fear the spectre of a significant regional power, whose pseudo-democratic trappings poorly conceal a regime dominated by radical Islamic ideology and militarism, whose leaders and people constantly express hatred of the US, and who over the years has harbored, sponsored and protected some of the worlds' worst terrorists - organizations and individuals responsible for the murders of thousands of Americans - who wouldn't be horrified by the prospect of such a state acquiring a nuclear weapon.

But enough about our ally, Pakistan.

I don't have illusions about what we are dealing with in Iran.  But Yi and CDM - while making some good points in this thread - are less forthcoming about viable alternatives.  The US is not going to attack Iran.  It is not going to happen, at least not without exhausting all alternatives and building a broad coalition for action.  The options are a diplomatic deal or some kind of containment/proxy war option.  But since the former doesn't exclude the latter, there really isn't any reason at all not to try it.  And there are reasons to think it could work.  Not because the Iranians are trustworthy.  But for the simple reason that the regime's own interests may well coincide with making and (mostly) keeping to such a diplomatic solution.

[KRonn]

This looks like a good first step on the way to stopping Iran's progress towards nukes, but is just a first step. More negotiations will be needed in six months to a year and it will take a real change of mind by the Iranian Mullahs to truly stop their desire of getting nukes. After all their rhetoric and actions over the years I'm still very skeptical that Iran wants to give up their nukes.

One thing that really worries me is the angst by Mid East nations on this proposed deal. I feel they know more about what's really going on than we in the West really know. Egypt, Saudi Arabia and especially Israel. I think even the Turks. Pakistan is supposedly willing to help the Saudis obtain nukes to counter Iran. Egypt and Saudi Arabia seem pretty miffed at the US and are talking about pulling back from working with the US. And I tend to trust Israel's instincts when it comes to intel issues in the Mid East.

Then again I don't fully understand why these nations are so angry since the other options seem to be business as usual and Iran getting a nuke, as I don't feel that military strikes would be able to end Iran's quest for nukes. Their nuke program seems too widespread for that.

[Admiral Yi]

You're mischaracterizing my position Joan.  I didn't say that *no* deal is worth doing, I'm saying we're paying too much for a two month setback in their nuclear program.

[CountDeMoney]

But enough about our ally, Pakistan.

[Jacob]

So anything short of total capitulation isn't okay?

Jacob asked the question of what Iran could do that's non-reversible.  I answered.  You're asking a different question.

You missed the key part of my question:

In particular, I'm interested in the kind of confidence-building part-way steps that are on the table right now.

Obviously you'd be happy with Iran conceding everything. That's not what I asked. What's an incremental step Iran can take to show good faith, as part of confidence building negotiations?

[The Minsky Moment]

You're mischaracterizing my position Joan.  I didn't say that *no* deal is worth doing, I'm saying we're paying too much for a two month setback in their nuclear program.

OK but the deal you would have preferred isn't available.
What's your next best option?

[Admiral Yi]

Obviously you'd be happy with Iran conceding everything. That's not what I asked. What's an incremental step Iran can take to show good faith, as part of confidence building negotiations?

I'd be very happy if Iran were to chuck their religious state, institute full democracy and freedom of the press and conscience, stop their support for Hezbollah, stop sending troops and arms to the Syrian rebels, and let us fuck their women.  But that's not part of the discussion.  So I'm not asking them to concede everything.

Your question is a paradox Jake.  Basically anything that is non-reversible you will see as not "incremental." 

For the deal to be symmetrical and fair we should have traded something reversible for something reversible. 

[Admiral Yi]

OK but the deal you would have preferred isn't available.
What's your next best option?

Something reversible for something reversible.  We can only unfreeze those assets once.

[The Minsky Moment]

He gave them $7 billion in unfrozen assets.

For perspective, that is about 1.3 % of annual GDP.
Not exactly immaterial, but hardly make or break either.

[The Minsky Moment]

OK but the deal you would have preferred isn't available.
What's your next best option?

Something reversible for something reversible.  We can only unfreeze those assets once.

Strict reversability x for x is irrelevant.
For example, we could easily cause that level of damage to Iran's economy by tightening back down on the oil sanctions. 
Of course that would require cooperation from countries like India that would not look favorably on rejecting diplo overtures.
The unfortunate reality is that our leverage over Iran, short of sending in the bombers, is proportional to the level of economic damage we can credibly cause, but that turns on our ability to convince the rest of the world to go along.