New map may explain Lee's decisions at Gettysburg

[The Minsky Moment]

There is another explanation and that is as a matter of grand strategy, the Confederacy was doomed unless the Pennsylvania offensive succeeded.  So from Lee POV it was a choice between an attack with a very low chance of success, and a certain chance of eventual total defeat if he withdrew without attacking.

[grumbler]

There is another explanation and that is as a matter of grand strategy, the Confederacy was doomed unless the Pennsylvania offensive succeeded.  So from Lee POV it was a choice between an attack with a very low chance of success, and a certain chance of eventual total defeat if he withdrew without attacking.

But even this would be ego speaking.  Lee was the biggest proponent of the "Second Saratoga" strategy, rejecting the more popular (and more feasible) cordon strategy that called for simply wearing the North out by standing on the defensive and forcing the Union armies to come at them.  In effect, he sacrificed the chance to make the cordon strategy work in favor of a low-probability-of-success gamble with the troops that perhaps could have made the cordon feasible.

You could argue that Lee's decision to invade the North rather than send troops to relieve Vicksburg had already doomed the South, but Lee couldn't have known that at the time.

[The Minsky Moment]

But even this would be ego speaking.  Lee was the biggest proponent of the "Second Saratoga" strategy, rejecting the more popular (and more feasible) cordon strategy that called for simply wearing the North out by standing on the defensive and forcing the Union armies to come at them.  In effect, he sacrificed the chance to make the cordon strategy work in favor of a low-probability-of-success gamble with the troops that perhaps could have made the cordon feasible.

You could argue that Lee's decision to invade the North rather than send troops to relieve Vicksburg had already doomed the South, but Lee couldn't have known that at the time.

I don't dispute any of that.
However, having made the decision to commit to strategic offensive in the East, it was success or bust.  Hence the Hail Mary attack on the third day.

[Berkut]

This kind of gets into the inevitably regressive "At what point should they have realized that the entire thing was doomed to begin with" question.

I mean, I am of the opinion that given the basic economic, demographic, and political realities of the situation, the South did much, MUCH better than could reasonable be expected. Their result was about as good as it could possibly get considering how ridiculously stupid the entire war was in any objective sense.

At what point should that have been obvious?

I think plenty of people thought it was obvious before it started...

[fhdz]

B.F.D. Stuart.

[grumbler]

I don't dispute any of that.
However, having made the decision to commit to strategic offensive in the East, it was success or bust.  Hence the Hail Mary attack on the third day.

I understand what you are saying, but if it was, indeed, "success or bust," then why didn't Lee attack on the 4th?  Sure, he had no reasonable chance of success on the 4th, but he didn't on the 3rd, either.

Lee's plan failed with the defeat of the flanking attacks on the second.  The attack on the 3rd was not the result of reasoned military planning, it was the result of Lee's ego refusing to acknowledge what his reason told him.

[Valmy]

Oh btw it is the 150th anniversary of Little Round Top today.

Fix bayonets!  Charge!

[jimmy olsen]

 Would this have worked better?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_Longstreet#cite_ref-47

On the night of July 2, Longstreet did not follow his usual custom of meeting Gen. Lee at his headquarters to discuss the day's battle, claiming that he was too fatigued to make the ride. Instead, he spent part of the night planning for a movement around Big Round Top that would allow him to attack the enemy's flank and rear. (Longstreet, despite his use of scouting parties, was apparently unaware that a considerable body of troops from the Union VI Corps was in position to block this move.) Shortly after issuing orders for the attack, around sunrise, Longstreet was joined at his headquarters by Lee, who was dismayed at this turn of events. The commanding general had intended for Longstreet to attack the Union left early in the morning in a manner similar to the attack of July 2, using Pickett's newly arrived division, in concert with a resumed attack by Ewell on Culp's Hill. What Lee found was that no one had ordered Pickett's division forward from its bivouac in the rear and that Longstreet had been planning an independent operation without consulting with him. Lee wrote with some restraint in his after-battle report that Longstreet's "dispositions were not completed as early as was expected."

[Berkut]

It certainly could not have worked any worse.

But no, it would not have "worked" either.

[dps]

It certainly could not have worked any worse.

But no, it would not have "worked" either.

The worst outcome I can see (that is, the best outcome from the Confederacy's POV) would have been that Meade would become concerned about the Rebels getting around his flanks, and withdrawn in good order to his pre-selected defensive position at Pipe's Creek (?--doing this from memory, may have the name of the place wrong), and then Lee's army would have been no better off than it had been at Gettysburg.