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#31

Off the Record / Re: Quo Vadis, Democrats?

Last post by Admiral Yi - January 08, 2026, 08:03:20 PM

I don't think that helps.

I think it helps quite a bit in refuting Bob's statement.

#32

Off the Record / Re: Quo Vadis, Democrats?

Last post by Sheilbh - January 08, 2026, 07:53:34 PM

I don't think that helps. For me that is very low for a president who basically incitedan insurection against the constitutional government of the US.

To me that number doesn't provide evidence of independence of mind but how effectively the GOP holds together and have been transformed by Trump.

#33

Off the Record / Re: Quo Vadis, Democrats?

Last post by Admiral Yi - January 08, 2026, 07:39:51 PM

Democrat senators go out of line while in office, while Republican senators wait until they leave office.

7 Rep Senators voted to convict Trump at his impeachment trial.

#34

Off the Record / Re: Brexit and the waning days...

Last post by Sheilbh - January 08, 2026, 07:35:22 PM

Well perhaps I do need to clarify "marbles"

I don't think you can make absolute and crystal clear bright lines between security policy, diplomacy, foreign policy, trade, economic policy, taxation, and economic regulation.  In fact, one of the aspects of the "Trump Effect" has been to blur and break down those distinctions.  It's in that sense that I mean EU membership necessarily puts some marbles in the EU basket.

Fair - but I think there can be a trap of putting too much emphasis on the moment of Brexit itself and not the previous 75 years or the subsequent ten. Brexit doesn't happen and the last ten years would also have been full of tensions and arguments and politics around the nature of Britain's relationship with Europe. We would not have put it to bed and just become good communautaire Europeans - much like the independence referendum didn't end Scottish nationalism or questions about the future of the union.

In a way I think the interesting thing, which is to the point of the UK not really seeing the EU as a security player, is looking at the "coalition of the willing" (it seriously needs a diferent name) which France and the UK are trying to cobble together. Because of the importance of Ukraine and the position of the US. I think we have a more European foreign policy than we ever did in the EU - when we were constantly trying to undermine Europe as an agent. Arguably in practical terms this is the most European Britain's foreign and defence policy has been since Suez: Britain and France working together militarily, unsure of and reliant on American attitudes to their adventure.

Edit: To be really, really puckish - I think there's actually an argument that Berlin and Paris are more able to push these E3 summits and stategies between France, Germany and Britain because Britain's not a member state. Within the EU it always becomes a question of then having to invite the President of the Commission - and if they're coming the President of the Council wants an invite - similarly Poland should be at the table, but if Tusk is there you probably have to invite Meloni and Sanchez. (FWIW I think it should be an E4 and Tusk should be at the table because I think it's not great to not have any CEE states involved and Poland's spending and seriousness on defence is very admirable ad important). I think that dynamic is part of the challenge for EU on a foreign and defence policy front (especially given unaninimity and leaders like Orban). Because I think the other counter-factual to Brexit Britain is the EU - and it has been a hugely important tool and body fo supporting Ukraine. But, even without moaning, "special relationship", veto-happy Brits it has not seen a leap forward in foreign and security policy....yet. Fingers crossed that happens.

#35

Off the Record / Re: Russo-Ukrainian War 2014-2...

Last post by Darth Wagtaros - January 08, 2026, 07:19:27 PM

Russian general killed by car bomb in Moscow, officials say

Tough time to be a Russian officer.  If you are not killed by your own people, it's the enemy that kills you.  Not fair.

Typical of Russian generals in wartime.  either you are successful and killed by your government or you are successful and killed by the enemy.  

#36

Off the Record / Re: Vacations Visions

Last post by Darth Wagtaros - January 08, 2026, 06:35:58 PM

Yeah, Aruba is nice.  

#37

Off the Record / Re: The Shooting Gallery: Poli...

Last post by DGuller - January 08, 2026, 06:31:54 PM

It seems confirmed now that the ICE officer that shot the woman was involved in another incident half a year ago when he was dragged by a car.  I wonder if that plays in his favor, or against him?  One can make an argument that his prior traumatic experience might've contributed to him acting in an unreasonable, and thus not legally defensible, manner.

#38

Off the Record / Re: The EU thread

Last post by Sheilbh - January 08, 2026, 06:31:09 PM

Not quite as poetic as Napoleon or Snowball.

No-one wants a poetic freezer

#39

Off the Record / Re: US - Greenland Crisis Thre...

Last post by Sheilbh - January 08, 2026, 06:25:26 PM

Has it not resulted in further military integration?

It is my impression that the war in Ukraine has pushed Europe closer in that area, but maybe that's mainly rhetoric and not actually practical?

No - and part of this could be defensive. Under the treaties foreign and security policy are for the member states and, crucially, at a European level require unanimity. It's part of the reason I've thought in the pas that "minilateralism" might be the best/more plausible route to European defence.

From the Bruegel report the Commission's 2025 budget proposal (for the next seven years) had allocations of €125 billion (or €18 billion annually). As Bruegel notes "in other words (likely guided by the political directives received from member states [...]), the Commission suggests keeping military issues as overwhelmingly member-state governed responsibilities, and does not intend to propose a material shift in long-term EU budget resources towards European rearmament." The very particular challenge with that is without a European level, it means Europe's defence policy and rearmament is in very tied to Europe's budget rules and national, member state fiscal constraints. That's why basically the only big EU countries with significant increases in defence spending in recent years are Germany and Poland.

But again to go back to Bruegel (I'm 50% with them on the NextGen EU Covid spending - but have some reservations):

COVID-19 for the first time breached the political 'urgency threshold' for largescale issuance of common EU debt, in the form of NGEU. With an EU candidate country already under direct military attack and seemingly no progress towards similar largescale direct common EU debt issuance in response, other non-war political topics in the EU seem similarly unlikely to rise above the urgency
threshold that would enable common debt issuance. The basic political reality of required unanimity among EU member states for common EU debt issuance also undermines any otherwise sensible functional arguments in favour of more common European debt to improve the functioning of European financial markets11 or – a more recent policy priority for many top EU officials – promote the global role of the euro in the international financial system12.
[...]
The warning signs for further EU integration are already flashing and the Ukraine War may become the first large crisis to affect the EU in decades that does not lead to meaningful additional institutional EU integration.

At an October 2025 summit of EU leaders, the European Commission presented a new Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030 (European Commission, 2025c) but EU heads of state made no new concrete defence-related decisions at the EU level. This was despite the Commission's explicit allocation of leadership in European military and defence matters to member states, noting: "Member States are and will remain sovereign for their national security and defence. They are responsible for defining the capability objectives required to ensure the readiness of their national armed forces so that they can fulfil their strategic-military missions, including those undertaken within NATO. Their respective national objectives and the associated timelines for achieving them are a sovereign decision." (European Commission, 2025c).

The big that has been talked up (and is not nothing) is a €150 billion loan instrument for a few categories of defence (and I think as much industrial as defence policy - not a criticism necessarily) - but again that is for member states to spend (and I've mentioned before - but the third biggest recipient is...Hungary? ). But to put in context, the scale of post-covid common European debt, that was at about €800 billion. The agriculture budget alone is around €400 billion. I think common debt is key because it's the way for Europe to mov to greater than the sum of its parts.

Agreed. I just think Mercosur and Venezuela matters much more to Brazil than Gaza - so that's where the effort should be focused when engaging with them.

I agree with Latin American countries (at least the post-pink tide ones, not the Operation Condor wannabes) - I also think it'd be a helpful way for Europe to go on the offensive. I don't buy the western hemisphere stuff about Trump (maybe true for some of those around him).

But I think Gaza is a huge issue for a lot of the global south. I think we underestimate the impact of the perceived hypocrisy.

Time will tell. There's some momentum to the China-Russia alliance, but I don't think it's permanent.

No doubt. I mean the North Atlantic Alliance isn't permanent - but it's seriously consequential.

I suppose what matters is whether it's opportunistic and what the window of opportunity is or if it's a fairly structural alignment for a while. 3-5 years? The estimate for Europe to fill some capability gaps and the range between the Danish and Norwegian estimate of when Russia could start messing with the Baltics - I think it's 5-10 for Russia to do something major.

I agree that Europe is potentially poised to start a Chinese style century of humiliation. However, I think it would be the wrong approach to accept it as inevitable and act as if it is an established fact.

I agree and I think this is to Zanza's point where, again, I agree - the potential capacity is there. Europe is rich, it's got innovative technically brilliant countries, it's got an industrial base in strategically important industries. There are structural challenges (no energy resources) but I don't think there's anything insurmountable.

My concern is around where we are, how long we've got and how fast we're moving.

#40

Off the Record / Re: What does a TRUMP presiden...

Last post by HVC - January 08, 2026, 06:22:12 PM

Googling it US mortgage debt is 13 trillion. Not sure how much this will effect anything, but the optics are good I guess.